## Facts

- C.P. was six years old and R.D. was nine years old when juvenile delinquency complaints charged them with aggravated sexual assault.
- The complaints alleged that C.P. and R.D. pinned down a six-year-old girl, E.Z., and inserted their fingers into her vagina.
- Before trial, R.D. underwent an evaluation that found he was developmentally delayed and lacked knowledge of most sexual facts.
- A psychiatric evaluation of R.D. agreed with the pretrial assessment and found that he was emotionally immature and had below-average intellectual functioning.
- C.P. was also assessed, with results similar to those found in R.D.’s evaluations.
- C.P. and R.D. moved to dismiss the delinquency complaints.

## Issues

1. Whether, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding alleging aggravated sexual assault, the common-law infancy doctrine and related capacity limits bar prosecution of children of tender years absent proof that they had sufficient capacity to commit the charged act.

## Decision

- The court applied the common-law infancy doctrine in the delinquency context, treating capacity as a required predicate to adjudication.
- As to C.P. (age six), the court concluded he was legally incapable of committing a delinquent act because of his age.
- As to R.D. (age nine), the court concluded the presumption of incapacity was not overcome on this record, given the evaluations describing developmental delay, emotional immaturity, and limited sexual knowledge.
- The delinquency complaints were dismissed.

## Legal Principles

- Juvenile delinquency proceedings, though not criminal prosecutions, require proof that the juvenile had legal capacity to commit the charged act.
- Under the common-law infancy doctrine, children below a minimum age are conclusively presumed incapable of committing a delinquent act based on conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult.
- For children above that minimum but still of tender years, incapacity is presumed and may be rebutted only with proof that the child understood the wrongfulness of the conduct.
- Psychological and developmental evaluations are relevant to whether the presumption of incapacity has been rebutted.
- Where capacity is not shown, dismissal is the proper remedy because adjudication of delinquency cannot rest on conduct attributed to a legally incapable child.

## Conclusion

In the Interests of C.P. & R.D. addressed whether very young children can be adjudicated delinquent for alleged aggravated sexual assault when developmental evidence raises serious doubt about capacity; applying the common-law infancy doctrine, the court held that C.P. was incapable as a matter of law and that the presumption of incapacity was not overcome for R.D., requiring dismissal of the complaints.


In the Interests of C.P. & R.D., 212 N.J. Super 222, 514 A.2d 850 (1986)