## Facts

- Judith Raybeck and Bruce Raybeck divorced in Texas in August 2005 after a forty-two-year marriage.
- The Texas divorce decree, based on the parties’ agreement, awarded Bruce real property in North Carolina and Texas and awarded Judith a home in Laconia, New Hampshire.
- The decree required Bruce to pay Judith alimony of $25,000 per year for ten years, payable in annual installments.
- The decree stated that the alimony obligation would end if Judith “cohabitates with an unrelated adult male,” but did not define “cohabitates.”
- Before the January 2010 alimony payment was due, Judith moved out of her Laconia home (and rented it to reduce expenses) and moved into the upper level of a single-family house in Plymouth, New Hampshire, owned by Paul Sansoucie.
- Judith had met Sansoucie through an online-dating service. Sansoucie lived on the lower level of the house, and they shared living space on the middle level.
- Sansoucie did not charge Judith rent. Judith paid about $300 per month for food and often cooked for him.
- There was evidence that Judith and Sansoucie traveled together and discussed marriage, though they had not actively pursued marriage.
- After learning Judith was living with Sansoucie, Bruce stopped paying alimony.
- Judith filed a petition in the New Hampshire family division to enforce the agreement and compel continued alimony payments.
- After a hearing, a marital master recommended finding that Judith was not cohabitating with Sansoucie under the decree’s termination clause; the family division approved that recommendation and ordered Bruce to continue paying alimony.
- Bruce appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, ultimately focusing on the need for a workable legal definition of “cohabitation” for alimony-termination clauses.

## Issues

1. What definition should govern “cohabitates” in an alimony-termination clause when the decree provides no definition?
2. What non-exclusive factors may guide a court in deciding whether a relationship amounts to “cohabitation” for purposes of terminating alimony?
3. Should the family division’s enforcement order stand where it was issued without the benefit of an articulated definition and factor-based framework?

## Decision

- The court defined “cohabitation,” for purposes of alimony-termination provisions, as “a relationship between persons resembling that of a marriage.”
- The court set out a non-exclusive list of factors to guide trial courts in deciding whether a relationship is marriage-like, stressing that no single fact is controlling and that the result depends on the total circumstances.
- The court vacated the family division’s order requiring continued alimony and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court did not have the benefit of the court’s clarified standard and guidance when it ruled.

## Legal Principles

- “Cohabitation” in an alimony-termination clause, when undefined, means a relationship resembling marriage—not merely sharing housing.
- The cohabitation determination is fact-specific, and no one factor (including sexual intimacy or shared finances) is required in every case.
- Trial courts may consider, among other things:
  - Whether the couple lives together on a continual, ongoing basis.
  - The degree of financial connection, including whether they share expenses, whether one supports the other, and whether they have joint bank accounts, shared investments, retirement planning, or beneficiary designations (such as life insurance).
  - The extent and character of the personal relationship, including signs of an intimate connection, shared travel, shared social life, and how they present the relationship to others.
  - Shared use and enjoyment of household space and personal property (for example, common use of rooms, furniture, appliances, vehicles, and whether a person keeps clothing or toiletries at the residence).
  - How friends, family, and the community view the relationship.
  - The parties’ age and circumstances, which may affect how much weight to give to certain evidence (for example, sexual aspects may be less probative for older couples than for younger couples).
- The court declined to simply adopt another state’s statutory definition and instead provided flexible guidance for New Hampshire courts to apply to varied living arrangements.

## Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that an undefined alimony-termination clause triggered by “cohabitation” requires proof of a marriage-like relationship evaluated under multiple, non-exclusive factors, and it vacated and remanded so the family division could reconsider whether Judith’s relationship with Sansoucie met that standard.


In the Matter of Raybeck, 44 A.3d 551 (2012)