## Facts

- Jason Carlberg transferred from Brebeuf Preparatory School to Carmel High School after his freshman year; at Brebeuf he had competed on the varsity swim team.
- Carlberg transferred for academic reasons, and his parents did not change their permanent residence.
- The Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA), a voluntary association regulating eligibility and interschool athletic competition for member schools, applied its “Transfer Rule” (Rule 19).
- Under Rule 19, a student who transfers for nonathletic reasons without a parental move has “limited eligibility” for 365 days after enrollment: the student may participate on junior-varsity or freshman teams, but may not compete at the varsity level unless an enumerated exception applies or the student qualifies under the IHSAA’s “hardship rule.”
- Carlberg pursued the IHSAA’s administrative process, including review by the IHSAA Executive Committee, which upheld the one-year varsity ineligibility determination.
- Carlberg (by his parents) sued to enjoin enforcement of the Transfer Rule, alleging that the IHSAA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious under Indiana common law and that the rule’s application violated due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
- The trial court granted injunctions allowing Carlberg to compete and also enjoined the IHSAA from enforcing its “Restitution Rule” (Rule 17-6) against Carlberg or Carmel High School if Carlberg participated under the court order and the order was later reversed.
- The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer (vacating the court of appeals opinion).

## Issues

1. What is the proper scope and standard of judicial review of IHSAA eligibility decisions affecting an individual student.
2. Whether the IHSAA acted arbitrarily or capriciously by applying the Transfer Rule to bar Carlberg from varsity competition for 365 days after enrolling at Carmel High School.
3. Whether the Transfer Rule, as applied to Carlberg, violated procedural or substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Whether the Transfer Rule, as applied to Carlberg, violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. Whether the Transfer Rule, as applied, violated Article I, Sections 12 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
6. Whether the trial court properly enjoined the IHSAA’s Restitution Rule in connection with Carlberg’s participation under the injunction.

## Decision

- The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the court of appeals decision, and reversed the trial court’s judgment.
- The Court held that IHSAA actions are subject to judicial review in this setting, but that review is limited and deferential.
- The Court concluded the IHSAA’s application of the Transfer Rule to Carlberg was consistent with the rule’s text and purpose and was not arbitrary or capricious.
- The Court rejected Carlberg’s federal due process and equal protection challenges, applying rational-basis review and finding adequate process through the IHSAA’s procedures.
- The Court rejected the parallel state constitutional challenges under Article I, Sections 12 and 23.
- The Court set aside the injunction against the Restitution Rule and upheld the IHSAA’s authority to apply that rule when participation occurs under a court order later reversed.

## Legal Principles

- Courts may review IHSAA eligibility determinations affecting students, but the review is narrow and does not allow a court to reweigh policy choices made through association rules.
- In reviewing an eligibility decision, the central questions are whether the IHSAA acted within its rules and whether its decision was arbitrary, capricious, made in bad faith, or contrary to applicable constitutional limits.
- Transfer restrictions that limit varsity eligibility for a fixed period when a student changes schools without a parental move are evaluated under rational-basis review; deterring recruiting and athletically motivated transfers is a legitimate objective, and a one-year varsity limitation can be a reasonable means to achieve it.
- Participation in interscholastic varsity athletics is not a fundamental right; substantive due process does not require that a student be granted immediate varsity eligibility merely because the transfer was for nonathletic reasons.
- Procedural due process is satisfied when the student receives notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard through the IHSAA’s established administrative process, including internal appeal.
- An association rule authorizing competitive consequences when participation occurs under an injunction later set aside (the Restitution Rule) is not invalid simply because it may affect decisions about seeking temporary judicial relief.

## Conclusion

The Indiana Supreme Court held that, although IHSAA eligibility decisions are judicially reviewable, courts must apply a restrained standard focused on rule compliance and arbitrariness. Applying that standard, the Court upheld the IHSAA’s Transfer Rule as applied to Carlberg’s non-residential transfer, rejected federal and state due process and equal protection claims, and lifted the injunction against the Restitution Rule, reinstating the one-year varsity ineligibility determination.


Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (1997)