## Facts

- The plaintiff, Innes, claimed that the defendant, Wylie, committed battery by standing in a doorway and thereby obstructing Innes from entering a room.
- Innes argued that Wylie's obstruction amounted to an unlawful application of force.
- The court determined that Wylie's act was limited to standing still and did not involve any direct active interference or affirmative movement.
- The judgment emphasized the absence of any affirmative, voluntary act by the defendant and characterized Wylie's conduct as passive obstruction without direct physical contact.

## Issues

1. Whether the defendant’s act of standing still and obstructing the plaintiff amounted to battery under tort law.
2. Whether battery requires a positive, affirmative act as opposed to passive conduct.
3. Whether passive obstruction without physical contact constitutes the intentional application of force necessary for battery.

## Decision

- The court held that battery requires a positive act by the defendant.
- It found that merely standing in the way, without any affirmative action, does not amount to battery.
- The judgment concluded that Wylie’s passive conduct did not satisfy the threshold for battery, as no direct, active interference occurred.
- The plaintiff’s claim for battery was rejected on the basis that liability cannot be imposed for passive presence alone.

## Legal Principles

- Battery in tort law is defined as the intentional and direct application of force by a voluntary act of the defendant.
- Liability for battery does not arise from mere inaction or passive conduct.
- A positive, voluntary act is essential for establishing liability in battery cases.
- The principle drawn from this case has been cited in subsequent authorities as establishing the requirement of an affirmative act for battery.

## Conclusion

The court in Innes v Wylie established that liability for battery arises only where there is a positive, voluntary act; mere passive obstruction or standing still does not meet the threshold for actionable battery, thereby clarifying the boundaries of tortious liability for intentional interference.


Innes v Wylie (1844) 1 Car & Kir 257