## Facts

- Innovative Health Systems, Inc. (IHS) operated an outpatient drug- and alcohol-rehabilitation treatment program and sought to relocate to a downtown White Plains, New York building.
- The City’s Commissioner of Building advised IHS that the proposed use qualified as a permitted “business or professional office” use because IHS would not dispense medication and would not have physicians on-site.
- Relying on that interpretation, IHS signed a lease and sought a building permit to convert part of the premises from retail to office use; the permit issued.
- Nearby residents and property owners objected, contending the use was a prohibited “clinic” (or akin to a hospital) under the zoning district.
- The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) held a public hearing at which community opposition focused on the presence of a substance-abuse treatment facility.
- The ZBA reversed the Commissioner’s determination, effectively barring IHS from operating at the site, and did not issue the written resolution required by the zoning ordinance.
- IHS and several clients in recovery sued the City under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the City from interfering with IHS’s occupancy and operation.

## Issues

1. Whether Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act apply to municipal zoning and land-use determinations as “services, programs, or activities” of a public entity.
2. Whether individuals in recovery from drug and alcohol addiction (and a provider serving them) qualify for protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act when they are not currently engaging in illegal drug use.
3. Whether the district court properly found irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to issue a preliminary injunction against the City’s zoning action.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction.
- Title II and § 504 reach municipal zoning and permitting decisions because they are governmental “services, programs, or activities.”
- The plaintiffs plausibly fell within statutory protection: recovering substance abusers not currently using illegal drugs may be “individuals with disabilities,” and IHS could sue based on injury resulting from discrimination against its clients.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding likely disability-based discrimination, given the reversal after public hostility, the departure from the Commissioner’s prior classification, and the lack of the required written rationale.
- The record supported irreparable harm to IHS and its clients from loss or disruption of access to treatment pending litigation.

## Legal Principles

- Title II of the ADA broadly covers actions of public entities, including zoning, permitting, and land-use regulation.
- § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is interpreted in parallel with the ADA for discrimination analysis when the defendant is a recipient of federal financial assistance.
- Individuals in recovery from drug addiction or alcoholism may be protected as persons with disabilities if not currently engaging in illegal drug use.
- A municipality may not use zoning powers to exclude a facility because of disability-based animus, stereotypes, or community hostility toward the people served.
- A service provider may have standing when it suffers direct injury traceable to discrimination against its clients, and affected clients have standing when a zoning action impairs access to services.
- Preliminary injunctive relief may be warranted where likely discrimination threatens noncompensable harms, including disruption of medical or rehabilitative treatment.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that federal disability-discrimination statutes constrain municipal zoning decisions and affirmed an injunction allowing an outpatient substance-abuse treatment provider to operate where the City’s zoning reversal appeared driven by hostility toward individuals in recovery rather than neutral land-use concerns.


Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997)