Facts
- AMD, a competitor of Intel, filed an antitrust complaint with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG-Competition), alleging Intel engaged in anticompetitive conduct under European competition law.
- AMD sought access to documents Intel had produced in a separate private antitrust lawsuit in federal court in Alabama.
- AMD asked DG-Competition to request those documents from Intel; DG-Competition declined to do so.
- AMD then applied in the Northern District of California for an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) compelling Intel to produce the documents for use in the European matter.
- The district court denied the application, concluding § 1782(a) did not authorize discovery for the requested purpose.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to consider the application on the merits, rejecting a requirement that the material be discoverable in the foreign proceeding.
- The Supreme Court granted review to determine the scope of § 1782(a) as applied to the European Commission’s competition investigation.
Issues
- Whether DG-Competition proceedings qualify as a “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
- Whether § 1782(a) requires that a foreign adjudicative proceeding be pending or imminent, or instead permits discovery when a proceeding is within reasonable contemplation.
- Whether § 1782(a) contains an implicit “foreign-discoverability” limitation barring discovery unavailable (or unrequested) under foreign procedures.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court held § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require, a district court to order discovery for use in the DG-Competition matter.
- The European Commission, acting through DG-Competition in competition enforcement, can qualify as a “foreign or international tribunal” because it functions as a first-instance decisionmaker whose determinations are subject to judicial review in EU courts.
- A proceeding need not be pending; it is sufficient that an adjudicative proceeding is within reasonable contemplation.
- AMD qualified as an “interested person” because, as the complainant, it had a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial assistance for the European matter.
- The Court rejected a categorical foreign-discoverability requirement and emphasized district courts retain broad discretion to grant, limit, or deny § 1782 discovery.
Legal Principles
- 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) permits district courts to provide discovery assistance “for use” in a proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal upon application by an “interested person.”
- “Tribunal” may include administrative or quasi-judicial bodies that act as first-instance decisionmakers and whose decisions are subject to judicial review.
- The foreign proceeding need not be pending; it suffices that the proceeding is within reasonable contemplation.
- Section 1782(a) does not impose a categorical requirement that the requested material be discoverable under foreign law or procedures.
- In exercising discretion under § 1782(a), courts may consider: (1) whether the target of discovery is a participant in the foreign proceeding, (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal and its receptivity to U.S. judicial assistance, (3) whether the request attempts to circumvent foreign proof-gathering limits or policies, and (4) whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.
Conclusion
The Court held that § 1782(a) gives federal district courts discretionary authority to order discovery for use in foreign proceedings, including EU competition matters before the European Commission, without requiring that the evidence be obtainable through the foreign tribunal’s own discovery mechanisms, while directing courts to weigh comity and burden-related factors when deciding whether to grant relief.