## Facts

- Boeing and the union were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement containing a union-security clause requiring bargaining-unit employees to pay union initiation fees and dues.
- Thomasine Nichols, a bargaining-unit employee, objected on religious grounds to joining or financially supporting the union.
- Nichols offered to make an equivalent charitable contribution in lieu of union dues and fees.
- The union rejected the proposal and requested that Boeing discharge Nichols for noncompliance with the union-security clause.
- Boeing refused, asserting that discharging Nichols would violate Title VII’s duty to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious beliefs.
- The union sued to compel Boeing to arbitrate whether Nichols should be discharged under the agreement; Nichols later sought attorney’s fees.

## Issues

1. Whether NLRA § 19, which provides a limited religious exemption to union-security requirements, displaces Title VII’s broader religious-accommodation duty in this setting.
2. Whether Title VII’s religious-accommodation requirement violates the Establishment Clause when it prevents discharge and permits a charitable-contribution alternative to union dues.
3. Whether an employer may be compelled to arbitrate a discharge dispute when the demanded discharge would violate Title VII.
4. Whether Nichols was entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Boeing and Nichols.
- NLRA § 19 did not supersede Title VII; the statutes were read to coexist, with Title VII independently protecting sincerely held religious beliefs.
- Title VII’s accommodation framework did not violate the Establishment Clause, distinguishing statutes that grant absolute religious priority.
- The union could not compel arbitration aimed at securing a discharge that would be unlawful under Title VII.
- Nichols’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs unless the employer shows undue hardship; the duty applies in union-security contexts and constrains union conduct that would cause unlawful discrimination.
- NLRA § 19 provides a specific accommodation for certain sect-based objectors but does not eliminate or narrow Title VII’s separate, broader protections.
- A neutral accommodation regime limited by an undue-hardship standard does not create an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
- Labor arbitration cannot be used to compel conduct that would violate federal anti-discrimination law.

## Conclusion

The court held that Title VII’s duty to accommodate sincere religious objections to union dues remains available despite NLRA § 19, that allowing a charitable-contribution substitute can be a reasonable accommodation, and that neither the Establishment Clause nor the arbitration provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement permit forcing an employer to discharge an employee in violation of Title VII.


Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 751 v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1987)