## Facts

- A church affiliated with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel outgrew its existing facility and sought a larger site to accommodate unified corporate worship and related ministries in one location.
- The church purchased property on Catalina Street located in the City of San Leandro’s Industrial Park zoning district, within an area the City planned to preserve for industrial and technological uses.
- At the time of purchase, “assembly uses” (including churches) were not permitted in the Industrial Park district.
- The City later used an “assembly use overlay” mechanism that could be applied to certain nonresidential parcels through discretionary, case-by-case decisionmaking.
- The church applied to rezone the property to add the overlay and sought a conditional use permit to operate the church at the site.
- The City denied the rezoning and permit, citing concerns about compatibility with nearby industrial activity (including hazardous materials), traffic and parking impacts, and preserving industrial land and potential revenue-generating uses.
- The church submitted evidence that no other property within the City could accommodate its size and asserted religious need to worship and conduct ministries together at one site.
- The church and related entities sued, alleging violations of RLUIPA (substantial burden and equal terms) and constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims.

## Issues

1. Whether the City’s discretionary denial of the rezoning/overlay and conditional use permit could impose a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under RLUIPA, precluding summary judgment.
2. Whether the City established, as a matter of law, a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify any substantial burden under RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny framework.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the City on the RLUIPA substantial-burden claim and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the City’s handling of the applications involved “individualized assessments,” bringing the dispute within RLUIPA’s land-use protections.
- The court concluded the record created a triable issue on whether the denials substantially burdened the church’s religious exercise, including evidence the property was the only suitable site in the City for the church’s needs.
- The court also held the City failed as a matter of law to prove a compelling governmental interest for its actions; preserving land for industrial or revenue-generating purposes was insufficient.
- The court did not reach the RLUIPA equal-terms claim or the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims because reversal on the substantial-burden issue made summary judgment improper.

## Legal Principles

- RLUIPA applies to land-use decisions made through discretionary, case-by-case “individualized assessments,” even within a facially neutral zoning scheme.
- A “substantial burden” may be shown where governmental action places significant pressure on a religious institution to change religious practice or effectively precludes religious exercise as asserted, particularly when the institution produces evidence of no adequate alternative sites.
- Once a substantial burden is shown, the government must prove the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.
- Generalized interests in preserving land for industrial development or maximizing revenue are not, without more, compelling interests sufficient to justify burdening religious exercise under RLUIPA at the summary-judgment stage.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that the City’s discretionary denial of rezoning and a conditional use permit presented a genuine dispute over whether the church faced a substantial burden under RLUIPA and further held the City failed to establish a compelling interest for the denial, requiring reversal and remand for factfinding and further proceedings.


Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011)