Jackson v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262 (HL)

Facts

• The claim arose after the Hunting Act 2004, which banned hunting wild animals with dogs, was enacted using the procedures set out in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, bypassing the House of Lords' opposition.
• The Parliament Act 1911 permitted legislation to pass without the Lords’ consent after certain delays; the Parliament Act 1949 reduced this delay period and was itself enacted using the 1911 Act's process.
• Claimants argued the 1949 Act was invalid, asserting that it was secondary legislation attempting to amend its parent Act, thus rendering the Hunting Act 2004 invalid.
• The challenge centered on whether the 1949 Act constituted valid primary legislation and whether the procedural use of the Parliament Acts amounted to a legitimate enactment of law.

Issues

1. Whether the Parliament Act 1949, enacted under the Parliament Act 1911 procedure, was valid primary legislation.
2. Whether the Parliament Acts created a subordinate or a parallel legislative process within Parliament.
3. Whether parliamentary sovereignty is absolute, or if fundamental constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, limit Parliament’s power.
4. Whether an Act passed using the Parliament Acts carries equal validity to one passed with the consent of both Houses.

Decision

• The House of Lords upheld the validity of both the Parliament Act 1949 and the Hunting Act 2004.
• The majority determined that the 1911 Act created a parallel, not subordinate, pathway for creating primary legislation.
• Section 1(1) of the 1911 Act was interpreted as meaning legislation passed under this process was “an Act of Parliament.”
• The court accepted that Parliament may be bound by procedural requirements from previous Parliaments, thus partially departing from strict Diceyan sovereignty.
• The Lords recognized that Acts passed through the Parliament Acts procedure are legally equivalent to those passed with both Houses’ approval.

Legal Principles

• The case reaffirmed the existence of limits on parliamentary sovereignty stemming from the rule of law.
• Obiter remarks by Lords Hope, Steyn, and Baroness Hale indicated that parliamentary power is not absolute and may be constrained by fundamental constitutional principles.
• The principle of legality requires Parliament to make its intention unambiguously clear to abrogate fundamental rights or principles.
• The judiciary has a supervisory role in upholding constitutional fundamentals, especially when parliamentary action threatens the rule of law.
• The decision recognized that there may be higher constitutional principles which even Parliament itself cannot override.

Conclusion

Jackson v Attorney General is a landmark constitutional case, affirming that while the Parliament Acts provide a valid alternative legislative route, parliamentary sovereignty is constrained by the rule of law and fundamental constitutional values, with the judiciary asserting a role in safeguarding these principles.