Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)

Facts

  • Nathan Jackson was convicted in New York of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after a police officer was shot during events following a hotel robbery.
  • Shortly after arriving at a hospital with gunshot wounds, Jackson made an inculpatory statement to a detective admitting the robbery and shooting.
  • Several hours later, after receiving narcotic and sedative medication and having suffered significant blood loss, Jackson gave a second, recorded statement to an assistant district attorney admitting he shot the officer and fired first.
  • At trial, both statements were admitted into evidence.
  • Jackson testified that his hospital statements were obtained while he was in severe pain and under pressure, and he gave an account that differed in material respects from the confessions.
  • Under New York’s procedure, the trial judge admitted the confessions upon finding a “fair question” of voluntariness and instructed the jury to disregard them if involuntary, but otherwise to consider their truth and weight.
  • The jury returned a general verdict of guilt, leaving no explicit determination of whether it found the confessions voluntary.
  • After state review, Jackson sought federal habeas relief, arguing both that his confession was involuntary and that New York’s procedure for deciding voluntariness was unconstitutional.

Issues

  1. Whether due process permits a procedure in which the trial judge admits a confession when voluntariness presents a “fair question” and the same jury deciding guilt also decides voluntariness through a general verdict.
  2. Whether due process requires a clear, reliable, and independent determination of voluntariness before a confession may be used as evidence of guilt.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court held that New York’s procedure for determining confession voluntariness violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • The Court ruled that due process requires a fair hearing and a reliable determination of voluntariness that is not affected by the confession’s truth or by the factfinder’s view of guilt.
  • The Court overruled Stein v. New York, which had approved the challenged procedure.
  • The Court ordered that Jackson receive a state-court voluntariness hearing before a body other than the jury that determined guilt; a new trial was not automatically required.
  • If, after a constitutionally adequate hearing, the confession is found voluntary, the conviction may stand; if found involuntary, Jackson is entitled to appropriate relief, potentially including a new trial without the confession.
  • A conviction based in whole or in part on a coerced confession violates due process, regardless of the confession’s truth and even if other evidence could support the conviction.
  • Due process requires an adequate and reliable determination of voluntariness, including resolution of disputed facts bearing on coercion, before a confession is submitted as evidence of guilt.
  • A procedure that leaves voluntariness to the same jury that decides guilt, without a separate and explicit determination of voluntariness, is constitutionally insufficient because the jury’s assessment of guilt may affect its voluntariness decision and a general verdict does not reveal how the confession was treated.
  • States retain flexibility in structuring the required determination, but the process must provide an independent, clear-cut adjudication of voluntariness (commonly through a separate hearing).

Conclusion

The Court invalidated New York’s jury-centered method for resolving confession voluntariness and held that due process requires an independent and reliable determination of voluntariness before a confession may be considered in deciding guilt.