## Facts

- E. Edwin Leach (plaintiff) was driving north on Ellamont Street toward its intersection with Clifton Avenue in Baltimore City.
- Howard W. Jackson owned an automobile being driven west on Clifton Avenue by Riall Jackson (defendants).
- The vehicles collided in the intersection, and Leach brought an action for personal-injury damages.
- Gerald Hall, a pedestrian walking north on Ellamont Street about a half block from the intersection, testified for Leach about the defendants’ speed.
- Hall stated he saw the Jackson automobile only “when it hit” and described it as coming up at a “terrific speed.”
- On cross-examination, Hall conceded the corner blocked his view down Clifton Avenue and that he could not see the Jackson automobile until it entered the intersection.
- Leach testified that when he was about 60 feet from the intersection, traveling about 15–20 miles per hour, he looked toward Clifton Avenue, had a clear view for about 180 feet, and saw no approaching vehicle.
- At trial, the defendants moved to strike Hall’s speed testimony, contending it was a mere inference because Hall observed the car only at impact.
- The jury returned a verdict for Leach in the amount of $10,000, and judgment was entered on that verdict.
- The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, challenging (1) the refusal to grant their demurrer prayer (sufficiency of evidence), (2) the refusal to direct a verdict based on contributory negligence, and (3) the refusal to strike Hall’s testimony about speed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to strike a pedestrian’s lay opinion testimony that the defendants’ car was traveling at a “terrific speed,” where the witness only saw the car as it entered the intersection at the moment of collision.
2. Whether the defendants were entitled to a directed verdict (or equivalent relief) on the ground that Leach was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in entering the intersection.
3. Whether, without striking Hall’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence of defendants’ negligence to submit the case to the jury (demurrer prayer).

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment for Leach.
- The trial court properly denied the motion to strike Hall’s testimony; his statement about “terrific speed” was based on an actual visual glimpse of the moving car as it entered the intersection, not pure guesswork.
- Because Hall’s testimony supplied direct evidence of excessive speed—the main claimed negligence—the trial court correctly refused the defendants’ demurrer prayer.
- The court also held that contributory negligence was not established as a matter of law; Leach’s conduct in looking and proceeding was for the jury to evaluate under the circumstances.

## Legal Principles

- A lay witness who actually sees a vehicle in motion may give an opinion about its speed; a short or momentary observation usually affects weight, not admissibility.
- Speed testimony should be excluded only when it is purely inferential and not based on any observation of the vehicle while moving.
- In intersection-collision cases, whether a driver exercised reasonable care in keeping a lookout and proceeding into the intersection commonly presents a jury question when the evidence permits more than one reasonable view.
- A driver who looks and sees no approaching vehicle within a visible distance that would matter for ordinary, lawful travel is not automatically negligent for failing to keep looking in that same direction up to the instant of impact.
- When the plaintiff’s alleged contributory negligence depends on disputed facts or competing inferences, the court should not take the issue from the jury.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the plaintiff’s verdict because Hall’s brief, direct observation as the Jackson car entered the intersection provided an adequate basis for lay speed testimony, giving the jury evidence of excessive speed, and because Leach’s lookout and entry into the intersection did not amount to contributory negligence as a matter of law, leaving both negligence and contributory negligence for the jury.


Jackson v. Leach, 152 A. 813 (1931)