## Facts

- In September 2010, the Army National Guard conducted live-fire training at Army Garrison Camp Williams in Utah using a .50-caliber machine gun on a range not authorized for that exercise.
- Fire danger was extreme due to dry conditions and high winds.
- The live-fire exercise ignited a wildfire that spread beyond Camp Williams despite efforts to contain it.
- Herriman City issued a mandatory evacuation order for nearby residents, including Lu Ann Jacobs-Peterson.
- Smoke and cinders damaged Jacobs-Peterson’s home in the amount of $3,662.70, which the United States acknowledged it owed.
- During the evacuation, Jacobs-Peterson tried to secure her horse in a neighbor’s horse trailer and suffered physical injuries when the horse shifted in response to smoke blowing into the trailer.
- Jacobs-Peterson sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence in starting and allowing the fire to escape, plus separate claims based on failure to warn residents and failure to help residents evacuate.
- The United States conceded it owed a duty not to allow the fire to escape Camp Williams and that it breached that duty, but denied any duty to warn or assist evacuation and argued its negligence was not the proximate cause of Jacobs-Peterson’s personal injuries.
- The United States moved for summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Under Utah negligence law, did the United States owe Jacobs-Peterson an independent duty to warn her of the fire or to assist her with evacuation?
2. Assuming the United States’ admitted negligence in starting and failing to contain the wildfire, were Jacobs-Peterson’s evacuation-related injuries a foreseeable type of harm such that a factfinder could find proximate cause?

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for the United States on Jacobs-Peterson’s failure-to-warn and failure-to-assist-with-evacuation claims, concluding no such duties existed on the facts presented.
- The court denied summary judgment on proximate cause for Jacobs-Peterson’s bodily-injury claim based on the negligently set and uncontrolled wildfire.
- The court held a reasonable factfinder could conclude that, when a wildfire forces a mandatory evacuation, injuries suffered while attempting to move or secure animals during evacuation are within the range of harms that can foreseeably result.
- The court rejected the argument that proximate cause required foreseeability of the specific injury mechanism (the horse shifting in a smoke-affected trailer), treating foreseeability as focused on the general type of harm.
- The court treated proximate cause and foreseeability as fact questions on this record, not resolvable as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- Under Utah law, negligence requires duty, breach, causation, and damages; proximate cause functions as a limit on legal responsibility tied to foreseeability and remoteness.
- Utah proximate cause analysis does not require that the defendant foresee the precise sequence of events or the exact mechanism of injury; it is enough that the general type of harm is reasonably foreseeable.
- Absent a special relationship or other recognized basis, Utah law generally does not impose an affirmative duty to warn others of danger or to rescue/assist others in responding to danger.
- Proximate cause is commonly a question for the trier of fact and may be decided on summary judgment only when reasonable minds could not differ.
- A plaintiff’s actions taken in response to a danger created by a defendant’s negligence may remain within the causal chain when those actions are a predictable response to the emergency.

## Conclusion

The District of Utah held that the United States had no independent duty to warn Jacobs-Peterson of the wildfire or to help her evacuate, but denied summary judgment on proximate cause because a factfinder could determine that injuries suffered while securing a horse during a mandatory wildfire evacuation were a foreseeable type of harm resulting from negligently starting and failing to contain the fire.


Jacobs-Peterson v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (2016)