Facts
- The defendant was given permission to stay at a friend's house.
- While intoxicated, the defendant mistook a similar house for her friend's, attempted to enter, and was refused access by the actual owner.
- The defendant broke a window to gain entry, believing it was her friend's property and that consent for damage would have been given.
- She was charged under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 for criminal damage.
- At trial, she claimed she honestly believed her friend would have consented to the damage.
- The lower court convicted her, ruling that a belief induced by voluntary intoxication could not suffice as a defense, relying on DPP v Majewski.
- The Divisional Court overturned the conviction and found in favor of the defendant.
Issues
- Can a defendant rely on a statutory defense of honest belief in the owner's consent, under section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, if the belief arose from voluntary intoxication?
- Does the policy exclusion of intoxication as a defense for crimes of basic intent, as established in DPP v Majewski, apply to statutory defenses requiring actual belief?
Decision
- The Divisional Court held that the statutory defense under section 5(2)(a) permits an honest belief in consent, regardless of whether that belief arose due to voluntary intoxication.
- It was determined that section 5(3) requires the court to consider the subjective existence of the belief, not its reasonableness or origin.
- The court distinguished the facts from DPP v Majewski, emphasizing the primacy of statutory wording over general policy exclusions.
Legal Principles
- Section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 provides a defense if the defendant honestly believes the property owner would have consented, regardless of reasonableness.
- Section 5(3) directs focus on the existence of a belief, not its intellectual soundness; a belief induced by intoxication is still legally valid.
- Policy exclusions regarding voluntary intoxication from Majewski do not override specific statutory language when Parliament requires consideration of the actual, subjective belief.
Conclusion
Jaggard v Dickinson clarifies that where Parliament makes a defendant’s actual belief central to a statutory defense, an honest belief—however induced—must be considered. The defense under section 5(2)(a) Criminal Damage Act 1971 applies even if the belief was formed as a result of voluntary intoxication, with courts required to prioritize statutory language over general policy against intoxication-based defenses.