## Facts

- The defendant was given permission to stay at a friend's house.
- While intoxicated, the defendant mistook a similar house for her friend's, attempted to enter, and was refused access by the actual owner.
- The defendant broke a window to gain entry, believing it was her friend's property and that consent for damage would have been given.
- She was charged under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 for criminal damage.
- At trial, she claimed she honestly believed her friend would have consented to the damage.
- The lower court convicted her, ruling that a belief induced by voluntary intoxication could not suffice as a defense, relying on DPP v Majewski.
- The Divisional Court overturned the conviction and found in favor of the defendant.

## Issues

1. Can a defendant rely on a statutory defense of honest belief in the owner's consent, under section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, if the belief arose from voluntary intoxication?
2. Does the policy exclusion of intoxication as a defense for crimes of basic intent, as established in DPP v Majewski, apply to statutory defenses requiring actual belief?

## Decision

- The Divisional Court held that the statutory defense under section 5(2)(a) permits an honest belief in consent, regardless of whether that belief arose due to voluntary intoxication.
- It was determined that section 5(3) requires the court to consider the subjective existence of the belief, not its reasonableness or origin.
- The court distinguished the facts from DPP v Majewski, emphasizing the primacy of statutory wording over general policy exclusions.

## Legal Principles

- Section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 provides a defense if the defendant honestly believes the property owner would have consented, regardless of reasonableness.
- Section 5(3) directs focus on the existence of a belief, not its intellectual soundness; a belief induced by intoxication is still legally valid.
- Policy exclusions regarding voluntary intoxication from Majewski do not override specific statutory language when Parliament requires consideration of the actual, subjective belief.

## Conclusion

Jaggard v Dickinson clarifies that where Parliament makes a defendant’s actual belief central to a statutory defense, an honest belief—however induced—must be considered. The defense under section 5(2)(a) Criminal Damage Act 1971 applies even if the belief was formed as a result of voluntary intoxication, with courts required to prioritize statutory language over general policy against intoxication-based defenses.


Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527