## Facts

- Stephanie Ann James and Roland James financed the purchase of a Ford Escort through Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford).
- The Jameses also obtained a credit disability insurance policy issued through Ford.
- The Jameses became delinquent on the loan beginning in March 1992.
- Ford sent the Jameses a notice of default and intent to repossess dated May 19, 1992.
- Stephanie James claimed she was injured on May 18, 1992, could not work for several months, and informed Ford while requesting insurance claim forms.
- Ford communicated with Stephanie James about the delinquency and warned that the car would be repossessed if she did not make a payment.
- Stephanie James objected to repossession and told Ford it could not repossess the vehicle.
- On June 29, 1992, Ford sent repossession agent Robert Klave, employed by Special Agents Consultants, Inc., to take the car.
- Klave removed the car from a parking lot, called Ford to report completion of the repossession, and received instructions to take it to an auto auction.
- About an hour later, while Klave was driving the car, Stephanie James spotted it, entered the vehicle, and a physical struggle occurred inside and outside the car.
- Stephanie James regained control of the vehicle and drove away.
- Klave reported the incident to police and reported the vehicle as stolen.
- On July 8, 1992, police located the vehicle, arrested Stephanie James, and impounded the car.
- Klave recovered the vehicle from the police impound lot on July 8, 1992.
- The Jameses later sued in federal court, asserting an FDCPA claim and related Minnesota state-law claims; defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the FDCPA claim was filed outside the one-year limitations period.

## Issues

1. For the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period, did the alleged violation “occur” on June 29, 1992 (when the repossession agent first took possession and control of the car) or on July 8, 1992 (when the car was recovered from police impound)?
2. If the FDCPA claim was time-barred, did the federal court have any remaining basis to hear the state-law claims?

## Decision

- The court held that the FDCPA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
- The court treated June 29, 1992—when Klave first seized the vehicle on Ford’s instructions and exercised control over it—as the date the alleged FDCPA violation occurred.
- The later July 8, 1992 recovery from police impound did not restart or extend the limitations period.
- Because the FDCPA claim was the only asserted basis for federal jurisdiction, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

## Legal Principles

- Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), an FDCPA action must be brought within one year from “the date on which the violation occurs.”
- In a repossession-based FDCPA theory, the limitations period runs from the challenged repossession conduct—when the repossessor first takes possession and control—not from later consequences or later related events.
- Temporary loss of control after an initial seizure, paperwork listing a later date, or subsequent police involvement and recovery do not reset accrual if the complained-of collection act occurred earlier.
- When the only federal claim is dismissed as untimely and no independent ground for federal jurisdiction exists, the court must dismiss the remaining state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that any FDCPA violation tied to the repossession occurred on June 29, 1992, when the repossession agent initially took the car and acted under Ford’s instructions, even though Stephanie James soon regained the vehicle and it was later recovered from police impound on July 8. Because the lawsuit was filed more than one year after June 29, the FDCPA claim was time-barred, and with no other federal basis to proceed, the court dismissed the entire case for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.


James v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 842 F. Supp. 1202, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 363 (1994)