## Facts

- Stanley Jancik owned an apartment building in a Northlake, Illinois complex that housed residents of varying ages, including children; the one-bedroom units could lawfully house more than one occupant.
- Jancik placed a newspaper advertisement for a one-bedroom apartment stating, in part, “mature person preferred,” with credit checks required.
- A fair-housing organization arranged testing using two prospective-renter “testers,” one white (Cindy Gunderson) and one African American (Marsha Allen).
- During Gunderson’s call, Jancik asked her age and stated he did not want “any teenagers”; after hearing her surname, he pressed her to identify whether she was “white Norwegian or black Norwegian.”
- During Allen’s call, Jancik asked about her age, marital status, race, and whether she had children or pets, stating he was “screening the applicants.”
- Both testers were told the apartment could be shown the next morning, but each was later told the unit had been rented; the ALJ found this explanation pretextual when considered with the timing and discriminatory questioning.
- HUD initiated administrative proceedings alleging a violation of Fair Housing Act § 804(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), based on race and familial-status preferences indicated by the ad and Jancik’s related conduct.
- A HUD ALJ found a § 3604(c) violation, awarded damages, imposed a civil penalty, and awarded attorney’s fees to the fair-housing organization.

## Issues

1. Whether the advertisement phrase “mature person preferred,” considered in context with Jancik’s statements and screening questions, indicated a preference or limitation based on race or familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
2. Whether the ALJ improperly awarded attorney’s fees without holding an evidentiary hearing on the fee request.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed HUD’s determination that Jancik violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
- The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings that the ad, as understood by an ordinary reader in context, indicated disfavored treatment based on race and familial status.
- The court affirmed the ALJ’s reliance on tester evidence and deferred to the ALJ’s credibility and fact findings under the substantial-evidence standard.
- The court upheld the attorney’s fee award and the denial of a separate evidentiary hearing because Jancik did not raise material factual disputes requiring testimony.

## Legal Principles

- An advertisement violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) if it suggests to an ordinary reader that a protected group is preferred or dispreferred for the housing.
- Although the § 3604(c) test is objective, contextual evidence—including the advertiser’s statements and screening questions—may be considered in determining the message conveyed to an ordinary reader.
- Explicit or targeted inquiries about race, and questions or statements indicating avoidance of children or younger household members, may support findings of race and familial-status preferences under the Fair Housing Act.
- Tester evidence is a valid means of proving discriminatory practices in housing and may support administrative findings when credited by the factfinder.
- In administrative fair-housing proceedings, an evidentiary hearing on attorney’s fees is not required absent genuine disputes of material fact; written submissions can suffice for determining a reasonable fee.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit sustained HUD’s finding that an apartment advertisement and related screening statements unlawfully conveyed race and familial-status preferences under § 3604(c), and it also sustained the attorney’s fee award because no material factual dispute required an evidentiary hearing.


Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995)