## Facts

- Jason P. and Danielle S. were in a long-term relationship, unmarried, and attempted to conceive.
- They used in vitro fertilization (IVF) with Jason providing sperm; Danielle carried and gave birth to the child (Gus).
- IVF-related informed-consent paperwork was executed, but it did not constitute a qualifying written parentage agreement under the assisted reproduction statutes.
- After the child’s birth, Jason alleged he lived with Danielle and the child and acted as a parent.
- Jason petitioned to establish a parental relationship and sought joint legal and physical custody.
- Danielle opposed, arguing Jason was only a sperm donor and that Family Code § 7613(b) barred him from being treated as the child’s natural father.
- The trial court accepted Danielle’s § 7613(b) argument and rejected Jason’s presumed-parent and equitable-estoppel theories.

## Issues

1. Whether Family Code § 7613(b) categorically prevents a sperm donor from establishing parentage as a presumed parent under Family Code § 7611(d) based on postbirth conduct.
2. Whether equitable estoppel can bar the mother from relying on § 7613(b) to deny the donor’s parental status.
3. Whether construing § 7613(b) to foreclose any path to parentage would violate the donor’s constitutional rights.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for Danielle and remanded.
- The court held § 7613(b) precludes a donor from establishing paternity based solely on a biological connection, but does not preclude presumed-parent status under § 7611(d) based on postbirth conduct.
- The court directed the trial court to determine on remand whether Jason met § 7611(d) (receiving the child into his home and openly holding the child out as his natural child).
- The court rejected Jason’s equitable-estoppel argument, concluding estoppel could not override the statutory policy reflected in § 7613(b).
- The court did not reach broad constitutional invalidation because its statutory construction left open a route to parentage under § 7611(d).

## Legal Principles

- Family Code § 7613(b) prevents a sperm donor from establishing legal fatherhood by genetics alone when donation occurs through a physician for a woman who is not the donor’s wife, absent a qualifying written agreement.
- Section 7613(b) does not categorically bar a donor from establishing presumed parentage under Family Code § 7611(d) based on postbirth conduct demonstrating a parent-child relationship.
- Assisted reproduction consent forms that are not drafted as a parentage agreement do not, by themselves, satisfy the statute’s “agreement in writing” requirement for determining parentage.
- Equitable estoppel cannot be used to contravene legislative policy embodied in the parentage statutes.

## Conclusion

The court held that the sperm-donor statute blocks biology-only paternity claims but does not foreclose presumed parentage based on postbirth conduct; it reversed and remanded for a § 7611(d) presumed-parent determination while rejecting equitable estoppel as a means to defeat § 7613(b).


Jason P. v. Danielle S., 226 Cal. App. 4th 167, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2014)