## Facts

- The United States placed nine minor noncitizens (ages roughly 3–17) into immigration removal proceedings.
- The minors alleged they were indigent and could not afford legal representation.
- Federal immigration law permitted them to be represented by counsel, but “at no expense to the Government.”
- The minors requested government-funded counsel; the government declined to provide or pay for counsel.
- The minors sued federal officials (including the Attorney General) in the Western District of Washington on behalf of themselves and a proposed nationwide class.
- The complaint asserted (1) a statutory claim that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) should be read to require appointed counsel at government expense for indigent children in removal proceedings, and (2) a Fifth Amendment due process claim that removal proceedings are fundamentally unfair for children without appointed counsel.
- At the time of the district court’s order, removal proceedings were ongoing for some of the named plaintiffs, while others were not then in active proceedings.
- The government moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 channeled the claims into the removal-review process and that the due process claim failed under Mathews v. Eldridge.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, to hear plaintiffs’ statutory claim that the INA requires government-funded appointed counsel for indigent juveniles in removal proceedings.
2. Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process claim seeking appointed counsel for children in removal proceedings.
3. Whether due process claims by children not currently in (or not imminently facing) removal proceedings were ripe.
4. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred classwide injunctive relief altering how removal proceedings are conducted, and whether declaratory relief remained available.

## Decision

- The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ INA statutory right-to-counsel claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that § 1252’s channeling provisions required such challenges to be pursued through removal proceedings and then petitions for review.
- The court allowed the Fifth Amendment due process claim to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage for plaintiffs who were currently in removal proceedings, declining to hold as a matter of law that unrepresented children necessarily receive all process due.
- The court dismissed (or declined to consider at that time) due process claims tied to plaintiffs who were not then in removal proceedings as not fit for review because they depended on uncertain future events.
- The court held that § 1252(f)(1) barred the broad classwide injunctive relief sought (an order effectively requiring appointed counsel for a class), but did not bar classwide declaratory relief.

## Legal Principles

- 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) generally route claims “arising from” the commencement or adjudication of removal proceedings into the administrative process and, ultimately, petitions for review in the courts of appeals.
- The INA provides a right to be represented by counsel of the noncitizen’s choosing in removal proceedings, but “at no expense to the Government.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362.
- District courts lack jurisdiction over INA-based claims that function as challenges to the conduct of removal proceedings when Congress has provided a specific review path through the removal case and petition-for-review process.
- Immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals generally cannot grant broad constitutional remedies aimed at how removal proceedings operate for a category of respondents; as a result, district-court jurisdiction may exist for certain constitutional claims not adequately handled within the removal case.
- Ripeness limits federal-court review where the alleged harm depends on future removal proceedings that may not occur or may not present the claimed constitutional problem in the same way.
- Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), lower federal courts generally lack authority to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” specified INA provisions on a classwide basis; however, the statute does not categorically bar declaratory relief.

## Conclusion

In J.E.F.M. v. Holder, the district court ruled that § 1252 barred it from hearing the children’s INA statutory claim for government-funded counsel because Congress routed such removal-related statutory challenges through the removal process and petitions for review, but the court permitted certain Fifth Amendment due process claims by children currently in removal proceedings to go forward at the pleading stage; it also concluded that § 1252(f)(1) foreclosed classwide injunctive relief requiring appointed counsel while leaving room for declaratory relief.


J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (2015)