## Facts

- Jenkins Brick Company, an Alabama brick manufacturer, hired John E. Bremer, a Georgia resident, to sell brick and block within a 50-mile radius of Savannah, Georgia.
- In Savannah, Jenkins Brick required Bremer to sign a non-compete as a condition of continued employment.
- The agreement barred competition within 50 miles of any Jenkins Brick office or plant for two years after employment and barred solicitation of customers Bremer had contacted; it also recited that Alabama law governed and that it was executed in Alabama.
- Bremer resigned and immediately began working for Spec Block, Inc., a Savannah competitor, allegedly violating the restrictive covenant.
- Jenkins Brick sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for injunctive and monetary relief.
- The Alabama district court transferred the case to the Southern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
- The Georgia district court held venue had been improper in Alabama under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), applied Georgia law, and granted summary judgment to Bremer and Spec Block because the non-compete was unenforceable under Georgia law.
- Jenkins Brick appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether venue was proper in the Middle District of Alabama under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) based on where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred.
2. Whether the transferee court was bound by law-of-the-case to accept the transferor court’s implicit conclusion that venue in Alabama was proper.
3. Whether improper initial venue required application of Georgia law (rather than Alabama law specified in the contract) to determine enforceability of the non-compete.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for Bremer and Spec Block.
- Venue in the Middle District of Alabama was improper under § 1391(a)(2) because no substantial part of the operative events occurred in Alabama.
- The law-of-the-case doctrine did not bar the Georgia district court from revisiting venue because the transferor court’s implicit venue determination was clearly erroneous and would cause manifest injustice.
- Because the case effectively belonged in Georgia, the transferee court properly applied Georgia law and correctly entered summary judgment holding the non-compete unenforceable.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue turns on where the acts or omissions that directly give rise to the claim occurred; the inquiry is qualitative and focuses on the operative events.
- Plaintiff’s residence, internal corporate decisionmaking, or contractual recitals (including choice-of-law and “executed in” clauses) do not, by themselves, constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to an employment non-compete dispute when performance and breach occurred elsewhere.
- A transferee court may depart from a transferor court’s prior determination under the law-of-the-case doctrine when the earlier ruling is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
- If the original forum was an improper venue, the transferee court applies the law (including choice-of-law rules) of the state in which it sits, rather than the transferor forum’s law that would apply after a proper § 1404(a) transfer.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the operative events surrounding Bremer’s employment and alleged breach occurred in Georgia, making Alabama an improper venue under § 1391(a)(2). Because the transferor court’s implicit venue ruling was clearly erroneous and unjust, the transferee court could correct it, apply Georgia law, and grant summary judgment invalidating the restrictive covenant.


Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 2003)