## Facts

- Darlene Jespersen worked for about 20 years as a bartender at Harrah’s Reno casino.
- Harrah’s adopted a “Personal Best” appearance program for beverage service employees.
- Male and female bartenders wore the same basic uniform, but grooming rules differed by sex.
- The policy required women to wear makeup (including mandatory lipstick) and required it be applied neatly in complementary colors.
- The policy prohibited men from wearing makeup and imposed stricter male hair-length rules (e.g., hair above the collar).
- Jespersen alleged that wearing makeup made her feel degraded and harmed her credibility and ability to manage difficult customers.
- After the makeup requirement was implemented, Jespersen refused to comply and refused to acknowledge the revised standards.
- Harrah’s informed Jespersen compliance was mandatory, offered transfer options, and terminated her when she continued to refuse.
- Jespersen sued under Title VII alleging sex discrimination based on the sex-specific makeup requirement; the district court granted summary judgment to Harrah’s, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed en banc.

## Issues

1. Whether a sex-differentiated grooming policy requiring women, but not men, to wear makeup constitutes sex discrimination in employment under Title VII.
2. Whether such a grooming policy is actionable as impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII and, if so, what evidentiary showing is required to survive summary judgment.

## Decision

- The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Harrah’s.
- The court held Jespersen did not produce evidence that the makeup requirement imposed a greater overall burden on women than the grooming requirements imposed on men.
- The court held grooming standards are not categorically exempt from Title VII sex-stereotyping analysis, but Jespersen did not present sufficient evidence that the policy reflected or enforced an impermissible sex stereotype disadvantaging women.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII permits some sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards if they do not impose unequal burdens on one sex in the terms or conditions of employment.
- A plaintiff challenging sex-differentiated grooming rules must provide evidence—rather than speculation—showing a comparative, unequal burden (e.g., cost, time, or effort) borne by one sex.
- Sex-stereotyping claims recognized under Title VII can apply to grooming and appearance codes, but liability requires proof that the policy enforces a harmful sex stereotype or otherwise disadvantages one sex because of sex.
- Subjective offense or discomfort with a grooming requirement, without objective evidence of unequal burden or discriminatory stereotyping, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming policy because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the makeup requirement imposed an unequal burden on women or that it constituted actionable sex stereotyping under Title VII, while confirming that grooming codes may be challenged on an adequate evidentiary record.


Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)