## Facts

- J.K.B. was a child with hemophilia who required blood-clotting therapy.
- From 1980 to 1986, J.K.B. received Factor VIII, a blood-clotting product produced and sold by Armour Pharmaceutical Company and other pharmaceutical companies.
- The Factor VIII J.K.B. received was contaminated with HIV.
- J.K.B. contracted AIDS and died in 1991.
- J.K.B.’s parents filed a products-liability action against the companies, asserting negligent manufacture, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability.
- The companies moved for summary judgment on the strict-liability claim, arguing Indiana’s blood-shield statute treated the provision of blood and blood products as a service (not a sale) and protected covered entities from strict products liability.
- The companies also argued they fell within the statute’s protected categories (including as “storage facilities”) and that their regulatory licensure satisfied the statute’s licensing condition.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the companies on the strict-liability claim, and J.K.B.’s parents appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Indiana’s blood-shield statute applies to commercial manufacturers and sellers of Factor VIII so that the provision of Factor VIII is treated as a service rather than a sale, barring strict products-liability claims.
2. Whether the defendant pharmaceutical companies qualified for the statute’s protection (including any “storage facility” and licensing requirements) on the record presented at summary judgment.

## Decision

- The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant companies on the plaintiffs’ strict-liability claim.
- The court concluded that Indiana’s blood-shield statute applied to the defendants’ provision of Factor VIII, preventing the plaintiffs from proceeding on a strict products-liability theory for injuries allegedly caused by HIV-contaminated Factor VIII.
- The appeal concerned only strict liability; negligence-based theories were not resolved by the summary-judgment ruling under review.

## Legal Principles

- Under Indiana’s blood-shield statute, the procurement, processing, distribution, and provision of human blood and specified blood products is treated as a service rather than a sale for purposes of strict products liability.
- When the statute applies, it bars strict-liability claims premised on treating the blood or blood product as a defective “product” sold in the stream of commerce, while leaving negligence theories conceptually distinct.
- The statute’s protection is not limited to hospitals or traditional blood banks if the statutory categories and conditions (including any coverage for facilities involved in storing or handling blood products, and any licensing or regulatory requirements) are satisfied.
- On summary judgment, if the undisputed facts show the defendant and the transaction fall within the statute’s scope, strict-liability claims based on contaminated blood products cannot proceed.

## Conclusion

In *J.K.B. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.*, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for Factor VIII manufacturers on the plaintiffs’ strict-liability claim, holding that Indiana’s blood-shield statute treated the provision of Factor VIII as a service and therefore barred strict products-liability recovery for injuries allegedly caused by HIV-contaminated Factor VIII.


J.K.B. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 660 N.E.2d 602 (1996)