## Facts

- Charles E. Joeckel, Jr. served as National Adjutant of Disabled American Veterans (DAV) from 1988 to 1993.
- During his tenure, DAV paid $80,000 to settle a lawsuit alleging Joeckel sexually harassed an employee’s wife after a DAV-related business meeting.
- Following internal dispute over the payment, Joeckel’s employment was terminated after a DAV review board found he used organizational funds without proper authorization to pay a private debt.
- DAV sued Joeckel in Kentucky seeking recovery of the $80,000 on theories including conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud; Joeckel counterclaimed regarding his discharge and membership revocation.
- After a trial, a Kentucky jury returned a verdict for Joeckel on all of DAV’s claims.
- Joeckel then filed a one-count action in the District of Columbia for malicious prosecution based on DAV’s initiation and prosecution of the Kentucky suit, alleging roughly $200,000 in defense costs, humiliation and embarrassment, and reputational damage.
- The D.C. trial court granted summary judgment to DAV, concluding Joeckel did not allege the “special injury” required for civil malicious prosecution under D.C. law.
- DAV cross-appealed from an earlier denial of its motion to dismiss, arguing claim preclusion based on a New Mexico proceeding.

## Issues

1. Whether D.C. law permits a civil malicious-prosecution claim when the alleged harms are litigation expenses, emotional distress, and reputational damage, or instead requires a distinct “special injury” beyond ordinary consequences of civil litigation.
2. Whether claim preclusion barred the malicious-prosecution claim based on a prior New Mexico judgment, and whether it was necessary to decide that issue.

## Decision

- The court affirmed summary judgment for DAV.
- The court held Joeckel failed to allege the “special injury” required to maintain a civil malicious-prosecution action in the District of Columbia.
- The court declined to address DAV’s cross-appeal on claim preclusion because affirmance on the special-injury ground made the cross-appeal moot.

## Legal Principles

- In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff asserting malicious prosecution based on prior civil litigation must plead and prove a “special injury.”
- “Special injury” means a harm beyond the ordinary incidents of defending a civil action, such as substantial interference with person or property (e.g., arrest, attachment, or seizure), rather than litigation costs, emotional distress, or reputational harm.
- Civil malicious-prosecution actions are disfavored; the special-injury requirement limits retaliatory “suit-within-a-suit” litigation and protects access to courts.
- A three-judge division applies existing precedent requiring special injury; changes to that requirement are generally for en banc reconsideration or legislative action.

## Conclusion

Because Joeckel alleged only defense expenses, emotional distress, and reputational harm—consequences considered ordinary to civil litigation under District of Columbia precedent—he did not meet the special-injury requirement for civil malicious prosecution, so summary judgment for DAV was affirmed and the cross-appeal was not reached.


Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 793 A.2d 1279 (D.C. 2002)