## Facts

- Minor plaintiffs alleged they were sexually abused by Father Edward McKeown over several years and suffered severe emotional injuries.
- A report within the Diocese in the early 1970s alleged McKeown molested a boy; the report was not credited.
- In 1986, a parent reported abuse to a bishop; McKeown confessed.
- After evaluation, a physician diagnosed pedophilia, warned McKeown should not be alone with teenagers, and recorded McKeown’s admission of abusing about 30 boys over 14 years.
- Following inpatient treatment, physicians advised indefinite outpatient treatment and that McKeown should never be assigned tasks involving contact with children.
- Despite these warnings, McKeown returned to parish duties involving youth; by 1989 the Diocese knew he continued working with youth, and his employment ended in 1989.
- In 1990, McKeown told the Diocese he had obtained employment with a juvenile court clerk, placing him around minors.
- The Diocese continued providing payments to McKeown until about 1994, though the parties disputed the nature and purpose of the payments.
- McKeown later sexually abused John Doe 2 in 1994 and John Doe 1 from 1995 to 1999; he was criminally prosecuted and imprisoned.
- Plaintiffs sued the Diocese (not McKeown in this appeal) for reckless infliction of emotional distress, alleging the Diocese’s handling of McKeown was outrageous and foreseeably created a risk of severe emotional harm to minors.

## Issues

1. Whether reckless infliction of emotional distress in Tennessee requires the defendant’s outrageous conduct to be directed at a specific person or to occur in the plaintiff’s presence.
2. Whether, viewing the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, the Diocese was entitled to summary judgment on reckless infliction of emotional distress based on remoteness or lack of causation.
3. Whether the trial court’s partial denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery should stand in light of the correct substantive standard.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court held reckless infliction of emotional distress need not be based on conduct directed at a specific person or occurring in the plaintiff’s presence.
- The Court reversed summary judgment for the Diocese, holding a reasonable factfinder could find outrageous, reckless conduct and a sufficient causal connection on the record viewed favorably to plaintiffs.
- The Court vacated the trial court’s partial denial of the motion to compel discovery and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard.
- The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Reckless infliction of emotional distress in Tennessee does not require that the defendant’s extreme or outrageous conduct be aimed at the plaintiff or occur in the plaintiff’s presence.
- Liability turns on traditional elements, including extreme or outrageous conduct, at least reckless disregard, severe emotional injury, and a sufficiently close causal connection.
- On summary judgment, courts must view evidence and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor; issues such as outrageousness, recklessness, foreseeability, and causation may be for the trier of fact when reasonable minds could differ.
- When a case is remanded under a corrected substantive standard, discovery rulings tied to the earlier framework may be vacated for reconsideration.

## Conclusion

The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a categorical “directed-at-plaintiff” or “presence” requirement for reckless infliction of emotional distress, reversed summary judgment for the Diocese because a jury could find reckless, outrageous conduct with foreseeable emotional harm to the plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings including renewed consideration of discovery.


John Doe 1 ex rel. Jane Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2005)