## Facts

- An Amtrak train collided with a tractor-trailer operated for Clark Gin Service, Inc. at a railroad crossing near Tchula, Mississippi.
- Seven Amtrak employees involved with the train (including the engineer and service crew members) and two passengers filed related lawsuits arising from the collision.
- The employee plaintiffs asserted claims against Amtrak under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging Amtrak failed to provide a reasonably safe workplace, including by failing to warn employees of the risk of collision.
- The passenger plaintiff (Murphy) asserted a negligence claim against Amtrak, alleging Amtrak failed to warn and protect passengers, including through the acts or omissions of Amtrak employees.
- The same lawyers jointly represented the seven employee plaintiffs and passenger Murphy in the consolidated federal proceedings.
- Because Murphy’s theory against Amtrak could be proved by showing negligence by Amtrak’s on-train employees, Amtrak argued that joint representation placed the employee plaintiffs and Murphy in conflict over fault allocation.
- Amtrak moved to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel due to a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (applied by the federal court through its local rules).

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs’ counsel’s concurrent representation of (a) Amtrak employees suing Amtrak under FELA and (b) a passenger suing Amtrak in negligence based in part on employee conduct created a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7.
2. If a concurrent conflict existed, whether it was consentable through informed consent or instead required disqualification because counsel could not reasonably provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client.

## Decision

- The court granted Amtrak’s motion to disqualify.
- The court disqualified Blake G. Arata, Jr., C. Perrin Rome, III, W. Chad Stelly, and Dane S. Ciolino from representing Benefield, Dorest, Johnson, Kern, Mayes, Murphy, Rainey, and Wilson in the consolidated litigation.
- The court found that the passenger’s negligence theory against Amtrak could require proving that Amtrak’s employees failed to act with reasonable care (e.g., in warnings or operational responses), while the employee plaintiffs’ FELA claims against Amtrak would be harmed by arguments placing blame on those same employees.
- The court concluded this placed counsel in a position of direct adversity and, at minimum, created a substantial risk that representation of one set of clients would be materially limited by duties to the other set.
- The court held the conflict was not consentable under Rule 1.7(b)(1) because counsel could not reasonably believe they could provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client given the likelihood that proving one client’s case would involve attributing fault to another client.
- The court required the affected plaintiffs to obtain conflict-free counsel going forward.

## Legal Principles

- A federal district court has authority to supervise attorneys who appear before it and may order disqualification when needed to protect fair proceedings.
- Under Rule 1.7 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, a concurrent conflict exists when (a) representation is directly adverse to another client, or (b) there is a significant risk that representation will be materially limited by responsibilities to another client.
- Even when clients are willing to consent, representation is prohibited if the lawyer cannot reasonably believe the lawyer can provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client. (Rule 1.7(b)(1).)
- When clients’ claims arise from the same event and their theories of liability are likely to require shifting blame among them (including blame aimed at a jointly represented client), joint representation can create a conflict that cannot be cured by waivers.
- Disqualification may be warranted where a conflict threatens to distort litigation strategy, discovery decisions, or settlement positions, and where allowing conflicted counsel to continue creates a serious risk of later challenges to outcomes based on conflicted representation.

## Conclusion

In Johnson v. Clark Gin Service, Inc., the court disqualified plaintiffs’ counsel because representing both Amtrak employees pursuing FELA claims and a passenger pursuing negligence claims against Amtrak created a concurrent conflict: proving the passenger’s case could require blaming the very employees counsel also represented, making the conflict non-consentable under Rule 1.7 and requiring conflict-free counsel.


Johnson v. Clark Gin Service, Inc., 2016 WL 7017267 (2016)