## Facts

- Herman J. Johnson, a Black employee at General Motors’ Lakewood Assembly Plant in Atlanta, worked as an hourly employee, was promoted to a salaried position in 1971, and was demoted back to hourly status in 1972 after a supervisor’s criticism.
- Johnson filed an EEOC charge in 1973 and was later promoted again to a salaried foreman position.
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Johnson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, individually and as a putative class representative for past, present, and future Black employees at the plant.
- The complaint alleged plant-wide race discrimination, including discrimination in promotions, job assignments, training/education, and dissemination of job openings, and sought injunctive and monetary relief.
- General Motors argued the case was barred by res judicata due to an earlier Lakewood-plant class action (Rowe) brought by Black hourly employees challenging discriminatory promotion procedures from hourly to salaried jobs.
- Rowe proceeded as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action directed primarily at injunctive relief; absent class members (including Johnson) did not receive individual notice, and the case did not provide individual damages to absent members.
- The district court held Johnson’s suit totally barred, reasoning notice was unnecessary to bind absent members in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.

## Issues

1. Whether res judicata can bar a later employment-discrimination suit seeking individual monetary relief by an absent member of a prior Rule 23(b)(2) class action when no notice was provided in the prior action.
2. Whether the absence of notice in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action limits the preclusive effect of the judgment to injunctive/declaratory relief rather than individual monetary claims.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that Johnson’s action was totally barred and remanded.
- The court held absent class members may be bound without notice by a properly conducted Rule 23(b)(2) action as to injunctive and declaratory relief.
- The court held due process requires notice before a prior (b)(2) class judgment can preclude absent class members’ individual monetary claims.
- Accordingly, Johnson’s (and similarly situated employees’) monetary-relief claims could proceed, while overlapping requests for injunctive or declaratory relief could be subject to preclusion depending on the scope of the prior judgment.

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 23(b)(2) class judgment may bind absent class members without individual notice as to class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief.
- Due process imposes limits on claim preclusion in class actions when the judgment would extinguish absent members’ individual monetary entitlements.
- Absent class members’ individual monetary claims cannot be barred by res judicata based on a prior Rule 23(b)(2) action when they received no notice of that action.
- The preclusive scope of a prior class judgment depends on the type of relief and the procedural protections afforded; equitable claims may be precluded without notice in (b)(2), but individual damages claims require notice before they can be extinguished.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that while a prior Rule 23(b)(2) class action may preclude later suits seeking duplicative injunctive or declaratory relief without providing notice to absent members, due process requires notice before that prior judgment can bar absent class members’ individual monetary claims; therefore, Johnson’s damages-related claims were not precluded and the case was remanded.


Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979)