## Facts

- Seventeen-year-old Amy Johnson died after a rear-end collision on U.S. 287 near Dumas, Texas.
- Amy’s parents, W.D. Johnson and Sally Johnson, were married. They sued Holly Farms of Texas, Inc., its driver Benford Earl Husband, and others for wrongful death and related claims.
- Earlier that day, Robert Harold Peret lost control of his vehicle while towing a rented trailer; the vehicle and trailer overturned and blocked the right northbound lane.
- Husband, driving an 18-wheel truck for Holly Farms, came upon the wreck and stopped his truck in the same lane behind the overturned vehicle, turned on his flashers, and helped warn approaching traffic.
- Cody Hall was driving the Johnsons’ vehicle with W.D.’s permission; Amy was a passenger along with another girl. Hall’s car struck the rear of the Holly Farms truck. Amy and the other passenger died shortly afterward.
- The jury found negligence by both Husband and Hall and apportioned responsibility 40% to Husband and 60% to Hall.
- The jury found Hall was acting as an agent for the Johnsons and also, in a separate finding, as an agent for Amy.
- The jury awarded the Johnsons damages for (1) pecuniary loss and (2) mental pain and anguish, and awarded damages to Amy’s estate for Amy’s pre-death pain, suffering, and mental anguish.
- Despite the damages findings, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment, reasoning that Hall’s negligence—because he was found to be the Johnsons’ and Amy’s agent—barred recovery.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Hall was acting as an agent for (a) the Johnsons and (b) Amy, such that Hall’s negligence could be imputed to them.
2. Whether the trial court correctly entered a take-nothing judgment based on contributory negligence when the jury found defendants’ negligence but assigned a greater percentage of fault to the Johnsons’ agent.
3. Whether the parents’ wrongful-death damages (including mental anguish and loss-type damages) are community property of the marriage or the separate property of each parent, and how that characterization affects the impact of one spouse’s contributory negligence on the other spouse’s recovery.

## Decision

- The court of appeals held the trial court erred by treating the parents’ recovery as entirely barred without properly characterizing the wrongful-death damages under Texas marital-property law.
- The court explained that wrongful-death damages are not automatically community property; the nature of each element controls its characterization.
- The court held that wrongful-death damages for a parent’s mental anguish and loss of companionship are personal to the parent and are the parent’s separate property.
- The court recognized that some pecuniary-loss components may be community in character to the extent they compensate losses to the marital community.
- Because W.D. Johnson permitted Hall to drive the vehicle for the family purpose, the agency finding as to the parents supported imputing Hall’s negligence to W.D. for purposes of community-property recovery.
- The court reversed the take-nothing judgment in part and remanded so that Sally Johnson could pursue recovery of her separate-property wrongful-death damages notwithstanding W.D. Johnson’s contributory negligence; the judgment was otherwise affirmed in part and reversed in part consistent with these holdings.

## Legal Principles

- Wrongful-death damages must be classified element by element as community property or separate property based on the type of loss compensated.
- A statutory beneficiary’s damages for mental anguish and loss of companionship in a wrongful-death action are personal to that beneficiary and constitute the beneficiary’s separate property.
- Contributory negligence attributable to one spouse can bar or reduce only the community-property portion of a recovery; it does not bar the other spouse’s separate-property wrongful-death damages.
- Negligence may be imputed through agency, but imputation depends on proof of an agency relationship sufficient to treat the driver’s conduct as the principal’s conduct.

## Conclusion

Johnson v. Holly Farms of Texas, Inc. holds that in a wrongful-death case arising from a child’s fatal collision, courts must classify each damages element as community or separate property, and a negligent spouse’s fault (including fault imputed through an agent-driver) can defeat only the community component of the parents’ recovery—not the other spouse’s separate-property damages for mental anguish and loss of companionship—requiring partial reversal of a take-nothing judgment and remand for further proceedings.


Johnson v. Holly Farms of Texas, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 641 (1987)