## Facts

- Travis Johnson and Christy Snow married and had one child.
- The couple executed a written separation agreement providing that Snow and the child would continue living in the former marital residence.
- Under the agreement, Johnson conveyed his one-half ownership interest in the residence to Snow.
- The residence was encumbered by two deeds of trust.
- The separation agreement allocated responsibility for the secured debts so that each former spouse assumed one of the obligations associated with the residence.
- The separation agreement was incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree.
- Both Johnson and Snow later remarried.
- Several months after the divorce, Johnson and his new wife filed a joint petition under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
- In the Chapter 13 plan, Johnson treated the deed-of-trust debt he had agreed to pay under the divorce decree as a dischargeable property-settlement obligation.
- Snow responded and asserted that Johnson’s assumed debt was a nondischargeable domestic support obligation (DSO).

## Issues

1. Whether Johnson’s obligation, created by the separation agreement and incorporated divorce decree, to assume and pay one of the deeds-of-trust debts on the marital residence was “in the nature of support” and therefore a nondischargeable domestic support obligation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5), rather than a dischargeable property-division debt.

## Decision

- The court held that Johnson’s assumed deed-of-trust obligation was a domestic support obligation because it functioned as support.
- The court ruled the obligation was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
- The court rejected plan treatment that characterized the obligation as a dischargeable property-settlement debt.

## Legal Principles

- Whether an obligation arising from a divorce decree is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” is determined under federal bankruptcy law, not solely by how the obligation is labeled in the parties’ agreement or the state-court judgment.
- Courts look to the intended function of the obligation at the time it was created, including whether it was meant to ensure that a former spouse and child could meet basic needs such as housing.
- A debtor’s promise in a divorce decree to assume and pay a marital debt (including a mortgage-related obligation), and to protect the former spouse from that debt’s burden, can qualify as support when its practical effect is to provide necessary financial relief tied to the custodial household.
- The statutory definition of a DSO in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) includes debts owed to or recoverable by a former spouse or child, established by a separation agreement or divorce decree, that are in the nature of support.
- If an obligation is a DSO, it is excepted from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and must be treated accordingly in a Chapter 13 case.

## Conclusion

In *Johnson v. Johnson*, the bankruptcy court determined that the debtor’s divorce-decree obligation to pay the deed-of-trust debt he assumed in the separation agreement was not merely a division of marital liabilities, but operated as support by helping preserve the former spouse’s and child’s ability to remain in the marital home; as a result, the obligation was a nondischargeable domestic support obligation in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case.


Johnson v. Johnson, 397 B.R. 289 (2008)