## Facts

- Albert Johnson, a male pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail, alleged that female correctional officers were assigned posts that allowed them to see male detainees naked in cells, showers, and toilets.
- Johnson claimed the practice violated constitutional rights to privacy and due process, and also asserted related Eighth Amendment and equal protection theories.
- Johnson sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple Cook County officials, including high-level administrators who were not alleged to have personally participated in the challenged monitoring.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; Johnson appealed, dropping a separate challenge involving a courthouse lockup bathroom.

## Issues

1. Whether routine cross-sex visual monitoring of nude male detainees by female guards is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether the same practice violates substantive due process rights to privacy or bodily integrity.
3. Whether the practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
4. Whether differences in monitoring practices among cellblocks, or staffing by sex, violate the Equal Protection Clause.
5. Whether supervisory or high-level officials can be held liable under § 1983 absent personal involvement.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim.
- The court held that routine visual monitoring of inmates, including when undressed, is constitutionally reasonable in jail settings given security needs and limited privacy expectations in custody.
- The court rejected the attempt to extend precedent limiting cross-sex tactile searches to routine visual observation.
- The court rejected the due process and Eighth Amendment theories because the monitoring was part of ordinary security practices rather than conduct intended to humiliate or inflict pain.
- The court upheld dismissal of equal protection claims based on differing monitoring patterns among cellblocks.
- The court held that most defendants were properly dismissed because § 1983 does not impose vicarious liability.

## Legal Principles

- Observation of inmates is analyzed under Fourth Amendment reasonableness principles; routine monitoring tied to institutional security is generally reasonable in custodial settings.
- Inmates have severely limited privacy expectations in cells and other supervised areas; continuous surveillance may be necessary to prevent violence and contraband.
- Cross-sex visual monitoring, without more, does not violate the Constitution when implemented as a neutral staffing and security measure reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
- Limits recognized for cross-sex tactile searches do not automatically apply to routine visual observation.
- Courts give substantial deference to jail administrators’ security and staffing judgments; employment nondiscrimination law permits assigning guards without excluding one sex absent a strong justification.
- Section 1983 requires personal involvement; supervisory status alone does not create liability.

## Conclusion

The court held that a jail’s routine use of female guards to visually monitor male detainees, even when detainees are unclothed, is constitutionally permissible as a reasonable security practice, and it affirmed dismissal of claims against officials not personally involved because § 1983 does not allow vicarious liability.


Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995)