## Facts

- Sarah Johnson sued Christopher Queenan for assault and battery, alleging that he raped her in a bedroom during a private party.
- Johnson alleged that she repeatedly told Queenan she did not want intercourse, but he held her down and raped her.
- Queenan denied rape and stated there was only consensual kissing, but he acknowledged that Johnson left the bedroom crying.
- After leaving the room, Johnson found her friend, Ryan Dadmun, told him what had happened, and Dadmun drove her home.
- The next day, Johnson and another friend, Staci Scolovino, went to a local emergency room.
- Dr. Ingrid Balcolm and nurse Heidi Crim examined and treated Johnson under the state sexual-assault protocol, which included reporting the matter to police.
- During the criminal investigation, Detective Michael Perron met privately with Johnson to hear her account and encouraged her to speak with her parents.
- Detective Perron accompanied Johnson home, where Johnson told her mother what had happened.
- Police charged Queenan with rape and assault and battery, but the grand jury did not return an indictment.
- After Johnson filed the civil action, Queenan filed counterclaims against Johnson for slander and abuse of process based on her accusations and her role in the criminal and civil matters.
- Johnson moved for summary judgment on Queenan’s counterclaims.

## Issues

1. Whether Queenan’s slander counterclaim could proceed where the challenged rape accusations and related statements were made to medical providers, police, prosecutors, and in connection with grand jury and court proceedings, and thus were protected by privilege.
2. Whether Queenan produced evidence sufficient to support an abuse-of-process counterclaim, including an ulterior purpose and a willful act that misused process beyond its regular function.

## Decision

- The court allowed Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Queenan’s counterclaims.
- The slander counterclaim failed because the statements at issue were protected by absolute privilege for statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial settings (including grand jury and prosecutorial functions) and, as to other reporting and investigative communications, by at least a conditional privilege that Queenan did not overcome with evidence of abuse of that privilege.
- The abuse-of-process counterclaim failed because Queenan did not show that Johnson used criminal or civil process for a collateral objective, or that she committed a willful improper act in using process outside the ordinary course of those proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, and communications closely tied to those proceedings (including grand jury testimony and communications to prosecuting authorities connected to the proceeding), are absolutely privileged and cannot support a defamation claim.
- Communications made to law enforcement and medical personnel in the course of reporting and investigating suspected criminal conduct may be protected by a conditional privilege when made for a proper purpose.
- A conditional privilege is not defeated by disagreement about the underlying accusation; it requires evidence that the speaker abused the privilege (for example, by acting with improper motive or otherwise misusing the occasion).
- Abuse of process requires (i) use of process, (ii) an ulterior purpose, and (iii) a willful act using the process in a way not proper in the regular conduct of the case.
- The mere fact that criminal charges were pursued or that civil litigation was filed—even if the opposing party claims the allegations were false—does not by itself establish abuse of process without proof of a collateral misuse of procedural tools.

## Conclusion

Johnson v. Queenan held that Queenan’s counterclaims for slander and abuse of process could not survive summary judgment where Johnson’s rape accusations and related communications were protected by privilege and where Queenan offered no evidence that Johnson misused criminal or civil process for a collateral purpose or through an improper act outside the normal course of litigation.


Johnson v. Queenan, 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 461 (2000)