## Facts

- Nancy Johnson was the spouse of a former railroad employee and received a spousal annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) beginning September 10, 1976.
- The RRA provided continued spousal benefits while the spouse had a child “under the age of 18” in her care.
- The RRA also stated that the amount of the annuity would be calculated using the method used under the Social Security Act (SSA).
- In 1981, Congress amended the SSA to lower the termination age for certain children’s benefits from 18 to 16.
- Congress did not amend the RRA’s express “under age 18” eligibility language.
- The United States Railroad Retirement Board (Board) nonetheless interpreted the RRA, in light of the SSA amendment, to require termination of RRA child-in-care spousal benefits when the youngest child turned 16.
- The Eighth Circuit rejected the Board’s interpretation in Costello v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, but the Board continued applying its 16-year cutoff at the administrative level, including within circuits that had ruled against it. The Eleventh Circuit later rejected the same interpretation as well.
- The Board did not seek Supreme Court review or obtain clarifying legislation; instead, it continued its practice of refusing to follow adverse circuit precedent in later administrative cases (intracircuit nonacquiescence).
- In 1986, the Board informed Johnson that she would lose a portion of her spousal annuity once her youngest child turned 16. Johnson pursued administrative appeals through the agency, and the Board affirmed the partial denial.
- Johnson then filed a class action in federal district court challenging (1) the Board’s interpretation of the RRA and (2) the Board’s policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the RRA channels review of Board decisions exclusively to the courts of appeals. Johnson appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the RRA’s judicial-review provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, barring a district-court class action challenging the Board’s benefits interpretation and nonacquiescence policy.
2. Whether the Board’s continued refusal to follow adverse circuit precedent deprived claimants of “meaningful” access to judicial review such that district-court jurisdiction was still available.
3. Whether the 1981 SSA amendment lowering the termination age for children’s benefits to 16 implicitly changed the RRA so that RRA child-in-care spousal benefits terminate at 16 rather than 18.
4. Whether the Board’s announced policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence in courts-of-appeals decisions is consistent with the statutory review scheme and limits on agency authority.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the RRA vests exclusive jurisdiction for review of Board decisions in the courts of appeals, not district courts.
- The court held that Johnson was not denied “meaningful” access to judicial review simply because she had to proceed through the administrative process and then seek appellate review, even though the Board had persisted in its position after losing in other circuits.
- On the merits presented through appellate review of the Board’s decision, the court rejected the Board’s statutory interpretation and held that the RRA’s child-in-care eligibility condition continues until the child turns 18.
- The court condemned the Board’s intracircuit nonacquiescence as troubling and in tension with the Board’s insistence that only the courts of appeals may review its decisions.

## Legal Principles

- When Congress creates a specific statutory review route for agency action, that route can be exclusive and can preclude district-court jurisdiction over challenges that are, in substance, attacks on agency benefits determinations.
- “Meaningful” access to judicial review is not defeated merely because claimants must exhaust administrative remedies and seek review in the forum Congress specified.
- Courts apply the statute’s explicit eligibility text; an agency may not treat an amendment to a different statute as silently revising unamended language in the statute it administers.
- A cross-reference to another statute’s methodology (such as benefit-calculation methods) does not automatically import changes to eligibility rules where the administered statute speaks directly.
- An agency’s refusal to follow controlling circuit precedent within that circuit conflicts with the basic structure of judicial review and raises serious statutory and constitutional concerns, even if it does not by itself open district-court jurisdiction where Congress has withheld it.

## Conclusion

Johnson v. United States Railroad Retirement Board held that the Railroad Retirement Act channels judicial review of Board decisions exclusively to the courts of appeals and does not allow a district-court class action based on alleged lack of “meaningful” review, but the D.C. Circuit also rejected the Board’s view that child-in-care spousal benefits terminate at 16, holding the RRA’s express “under age 18” requirement controls and sharply disapproved the Board’s intracircuit nonacquiescence.


Johnson v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, 969 F.2d 1082 (1992)