## Facts

- In November 1973, William Michael Jones (age 17) signed a written agreement to use a recreational skydiving facility operated by Free Flight Sport Aviation, Inc., including transport to jump sites by aircraft.
- The agreement contained a broad exculpatory clause releasing Free Flight and related persons and entities from liability for injuries arising on its premises or aircraft, including injuries caused by the corporation’s negligence.
- The agreement also contained an alternative option under which Jones could have participated at higher cost without releasing negligence liability.
- Jones turned 18 in December 1973 and continued to use the skydiving facilities without repudiating the agreement.
- In October 1974, a plane furnished for the skydiving operation crashed shortly after takeoff, seriously injuring Jones.
- In November 1975, Jones sued Free Flight and other associated defendants, asserting negligence and willful and wanton conduct.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment for defendants on the ordinary negligence claims based on the exculpatory agreement, leaving willful and wanton claims pending.

## Issues

1. Whether Jones’s post-majority conduct ratified the contract he signed as a minor, precluding disaffirmance.
2. Whether the exculpatory clause was unenforceable as against public policy, an adhesion contract, or insufficiently clear to release defendants from liability for ordinary negligence.
3. Whether the defendants’ provision of air transport made them common carriers unable to contractually limit liability for negligence.

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment enforcing the exculpatory agreement as to ordinary negligence.
- The court held Jones ratified the agreement after reaching majority by continuing to use the facilities without timely disaffirmance.
- The court held the release was not void as against public policy because it involved a nonessential recreational activity and was fairly entered.
- The court held the agreement was not an unenforceable adhesion contract given the lack of necessity or compulsion and the presence of an alternative arrangement.
- The court held the language clearly and unambiguously released defendants from liability for ordinary negligence.
- The court rejected the common-carrier argument because the flight was incidental to the recreational activity, not public transportation service.
- The ruling did not resolve the willful and wanton claims, which remained pending in the trial court.

## Legal Principles

- Exculpatory agreements releasing a party from liability for its own ordinary negligence may be enforced when the transaction does not implicate a public duty, the service is not essential, the agreement is fairly entered, and the intent to waive negligence liability is stated in clear, unambiguous language.
- A contract signed during minority may be ratified after majority by conduct accepting benefits under the agreement, which can bar later disaffirmance.
- A standardized release used in a voluntary recreational setting is not necessarily an adhesion contract absent lack of meaningful choice tied to a necessary service.
- An operator providing transportation incidental to a recreational activity is not treated as a common carrier for purposes of restricting contractual limitations of negligence liability.
- A negligence waiver that bars ordinary negligence does not necessarily bar claims based on willful and wanton conduct.

## Conclusion

The Colorado Supreme Court enforced a skydiving liability release to bar ordinary negligence claims because the activity was recreational and nonessential, the waiver clearly covered negligence, Jones ratified the agreement after turning 18, and the defendants were not common carriers; claims alleging willful and wanton conduct were left for further proceedings.


Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981)