## Facts

- Bradley Jones was engaged to Kathryn Brooke Sauer, a Kentucky state prisoner incarcerated at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women.
- In July 2016, Jones went to the Shelby County Clerk’s Office seeking a Kentucky marriage license so he and Sauer could marry.
- Shelby County Clerk Sue Carole Perry refused to issue the license because her office interpreted Kentucky law to require both applicants to appear in person at the clerk’s office and sign the marriage-license application.
- Sauer could not travel to the clerk’s office due to her incarceration, and the prison refused to transport her to satisfy the in-person requirement.
- Perry’s interpretation relied on a 2008 memorandum from the Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives (KDLA). The memo reasoned that the marriage-license application contains signature lines for both parties and that Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.110 requires the clerk to ensure required blanks are filled before delivering a license, so both parties must be present to sign.
- In 2009, the Kentucky Office of the Attorney General issued a letter warning that the KDLA’s in-person practice likely interfered with a prisoner’s fundamental right to marry and suggesting that officials establish a workable procedure to allow incarcerated persons to marry.
- Despite that warning, Perry continued using the same in-person requirement, which—given Sauer’s confinement and the prison’s refusal to transport her—functioned as a complete barrier to Jones and Sauer obtaining a marriage license.
- Jones sued Perry (including in her official capacity) asserting that the categorical in-person requirement violated his fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and sought injunctive relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the Shelby County Clerk’s categorical requirement that both marriage-license applicants physically appear at the clerk’s office, when one applicant is incarcerated and cannot appear, directly and substantially burdens the Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right to marry.
2. Whether Jones was entitled to permanent injunctive relief barring enforcement of the in-person requirement against him and requiring the clerk to implement a procedure that would allow issuance of a license without the couple’s in-person appearance.

## Decision

- The court treated Jones’s request for a preliminary injunction as a request for permanent injunctive relief because the dispute presented no material fact issues requiring an evidentiary hearing and the record was sufficient to decide the constitutional question.
- The court concluded Kentucky’s marriage statutes did not require the clerk’s blanket in-person appearance rule; the rule arose from administrative interpretation rather than statutory text.
- The court held marriage is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and incarceration does not extinguish the right to marry.
- The court found Perry’s in-person requirement imposed a direct and substantial interference with Jones’s right to marry because it effectively prevented Jones and Sauer from obtaining a license at all.
- Applying heightened constitutional review, the court determined Perry did not justify the categorical rule with sufficiently weighty governmental interests implemented through a narrowly tailored means, particularly where less restrictive options were available (such as verification procedures that could occur without transporting Sauer to the clerk’s office).
- The court granted injunctive relief and permanently enjoined Perry from requiring Sauer to appear at the Shelby County Clerk’s Office as a precondition to issuing Jones a marriage license.
- The court ordered Perry to implement and carry out a procedure, by a set deadline (November 4, 2016), that would permit Jones and Sauer to obtain a marriage license without physically appearing at the clerk’s office.

## Legal Principles

- The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects the fundamental right to marry.
- Government action that directly and substantially interferes with the right to marry is subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny and must be justified by sufficiently weighty governmental interests through narrowly tailored means.
- Prisoners retain the constitutional right to marry, and government officials may not impose restrictions that effectively bar marriage absent adequate justification.
- Administrative practices that add extra requirements not found in the governing statutes cannot stand when they operate as categorical barriers to exercising a fundamental right.
- Prospective injunctive relief may be ordered against an appropriate government official to prevent ongoing enforcement of an unconstitutional practice.
- Permanent injunctive relief is warranted when the plaintiff proves a constitutional violation, the ongoing deprivation of a constitutional right constitutes irreparable harm, and the balance of equities and public interest favor preventing continued unconstitutional enforcement.

## Conclusion

In *Jones v. Perry*, the Eastern District of Kentucky held that Shelby County Clerk Sue Carole Perry’s blanket in-person requirement for marriage-license applicants—derived from an administrative interpretation rather than Kentucky’s marriage statutes—directly and substantially interfered with Bradley Jones’s fundamental right to marry because it made a license unattainable while his fiancé was incarcerated and could not appear; the court therefore granted permanent injunctive relief, barred enforcement of the in-person rule against Jones and Sauer, and ordered the clerk to implement a procedure allowing the couple to obtain a license without appearing at the clerk’s office.


Jones v. Perry, 215 F. Supp. 3d 563 (2016)