## Facts

- Richard M. Jones, a hospital administrator, was married to Donna Jones, a nurse; they had four children and lived in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
- Todd V. Swanson, an orthopedic surgeon, had dated Donna briefly in 1977–78; they had no contact for about twenty years.
- Donna had expressed marital dissatisfaction before Swanson reappeared and engaged in late-night socializing and heavy drinking; there was evidence of flirtation and physical intimacy with another man, Ted Ries.
- In September 1998, Swanson returned to Sioux Falls to visit his father; Swanson and Donna reconnected and began a long-distance romantic relationship.
- Swanson and Donna pursued an extended affair that included trips together, joint counseling about their relationship, and a ten-day European vacation.
- In January 1999, Donna moved out of the marital home; she later briefly returned and attended counseling with Richard.
- After Swanson returned to Sioux Falls again, Donna contacted him and they had sexual relations.
- Richard sued Swanson for alienation of affection under South Dakota law and later filed for divorce.
- A jury awarded Richard $450,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

## Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Swanson’s conduct was a controlling cause of the alienation of Donna’s affection from Richard under South Dakota law.
2. Whether the evidence supported the jury’s compensatory and punitive damages awards, both as to availability and amount.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing Swanson’s requested “alternative-cause” jury instruction attributing the marital breakdown to causes other than Swanson’s conduct.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on liability, holding the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find the marriage retained affection and that Swanson’s intentional conduct was a controlling cause of its loss.
- The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the proposed “alternative-cause” instruction because the instructions as a whole adequately stated the governing causation principles and allowed Swanson to argue his theory.
- The court affirmed that punitive damages were legally available on the record but held both damage amounts were excessive.
- The court ordered remittitur reducing compensatory damages from $450,000 to $150,000 and punitive damages from $500,000 to $250,000, conditionally affirming the judgment upon acceptance; otherwise, a new trial on damages was required.

## Legal Principles

- Under South Dakota law, alienation of affection requires proof that (1) love and affection existed, (2) the defendant’s wrongful conduct was a controlling cause of the loss of affection, and (3) actual loss of affection occurred.
- A strained marriage may still support liability if some genuine marital affection existed and the defendant’s intentional interference is found to be a controlling cause of its destruction.
- On review of a verdict, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party; judgment as a matter of law is proper only when no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.
- A trial court need not give a requested instruction if the charge, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately submits the issues and applicable law to the jury.
- Punitive damages under South Dakota law require proof of willful, wanton, or malicious disregard of another’s rights; appellate courts may reduce excessive punitive awards consistent with state law and due process limits.
- Remittitur is an appropriate remedy when the evidence supports liability and some damages but not the jury’s amounts.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported an alienation-of-affection verdict against Swanson and supported punitive-damages eligibility, rejected an asserted instructional error, and conditionally affirmed after ordering substantial remittitur of both compensatory and punitive damages.


Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2003)