## Facts

- Federal defendants were tried on multiple drug charges, including a charged drug conspiracy.
- The jury convicted defendants of certain drug offenses but acquitted them of the charged conspiracy.
- At sentencing, the district judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants had participated in the conspiracy despite the acquittals.
- Based largely on that judicial finding, the court imposed sentences substantially longer than those that would have resulted without the acquitted-conduct finding.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed, relying on precedent permitting consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing so long as the sentence remains within the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict.
- Defendants petitioned for certiorari, arguing that increasing sentences based on acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right as developed in the Court’s modern sentencing cases.
- The Supreme Court denied certiorari; Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, dissented from the denial.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment permits a sentencing judge to increase a defendant’s sentence based on conduct of which the defendant was acquitted, found by the judge under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
2. Whether prior precedent allowing acquitted-conduct sentencing remains valid in light of later Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine emphasizing jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the D.C. Circuit’s judgment intact.
- Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, dissented from the denial, urging the Court to review whether acquitted-conduct sentencing is consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
- The dissent argued that using acquitted conduct to impose a substantially higher sentence treats a defendant as punished for a crime the jury rejected, weakening the jury’s constitutional role.
- The dissent questioned lower courts’ reliance on *United States v. Watts*, noting it arose before the Court’s modern Sixth Amendment sentencing cases and did not resolve the post-*Apprendi* jury-right question.

## Legal Principles

- A denial of certiorari resolves no merits question and creates no binding Supreme Court precedent; it leaves lower-court rulings undisturbed.
- Under then-prevailing federal appellate practice, sentencing courts could consider “acquitted conduct” proven by a preponderance of the evidence when selecting a sentence within the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict.
- The dissent maintained that Sixth Amendment doctrine concerning jury factfinding and punishment raises serious constitutional doubts about materially increasing sentences based on facts necessarily rejected by a jury’s acquittal.
- The dissent characterized the issue as recurring in federal sentencing and appropriate for Supreme Court review.

## Conclusion

The Court’s denial of certiorari left in place the acceptance of acquitted-conduct sentencing within statutory limits, while a dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg) argued that dramatically increasing sentences based on acquitted conduct conflicts with the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the jury’s verdict.


Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014)