Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)

Facts

  • New York required a state license before any motion picture could be exhibited for pay, and authorized denial or revocation if a film was “obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious,” or otherwise harmful.
  • Joseph Burstyn, Inc., held exclusive U.S. distribution rights to the Italian film The Miracle, shown in New York as part of Ways of Love.
  • The Miracle depicted a disturbed woman who believes she is the Virgin Mary, is impregnated by a man she imagines to be St. Joseph, and believes her child is Christ.
  • The State initially licensed the film, and it played in New York City for about eight weeks.
  • After receiving substantial public complaints and defenses, the New York Board of Regents determined the film was “sacrilegious” and rescinded the license, barring further exhibition.
  • Burstyn challenged the “sacrilegious” licensing standard as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issues

  1. Whether motion pictures are expression protected by the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  2. Whether a film-licensing scheme that permits banning a film as “sacrilegious” imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and press.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals.
  • The Court held that motion pictures are a protected medium of expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
  • The Court held that New York’s “sacrilegious” licensing provision was unconstitutional because it authorized a prior restraint on expression.
  • To the extent Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n denied First Amendment protection to motion pictures, it was overruled.
  • Concurrences agreed the “sacrilegious” standard could not stand, while expressing caution about the scope of the Court’s broader statements on film licensing.
  • Motion pictures are within the First Amendment’s protections for speech and press, even when produced and distributed for profit.
  • Prior restraints through licensing schemes are especially disfavored and require narrowly limited standards.
  • A censorship standard allowing suppression of films deemed “sacrilegious” is impermissibly broad and grants officials excessive discretion, enabling content-based suppression tied to religious offense.
  • The State may not exclude an entire medium from constitutional protection based on claims of a heightened “capacity for evil.”

Conclusion

The Court recognized films as protected speech and invalidated New York’s authority to deny or revoke exhibition licenses on the ground that a film is “sacrilegious,” holding that this content-based, discretionary licensing standard operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.