Joslin v. Pine River Dev. Corp., 116 N.H. 814, 367 A.2d 599 (N.H. 1976)

Facts

  • A subdivision on Pine River Pond in Wakefield, New Hampshire included shorefront lots (including Lot 26) and numerous back lots without pond frontage.
  • Shorefront lots were conveyed subject to identical restrictive covenants, primarily limiting the type and character of residential structures and related appurtenances.
  • Pine River Development Corporation acquired Lot 26 and a large, non-frontage tract, subdivided the tract into many back lots, and sold most of them to individual purchasers.
  • Some back-lot purchasers formed Pine River Association, Inc.
  • To provide back-lot owners pond access, the developer conveyed Lot 26 to the Association for common use, and defendants cleared Lot 26 to create a beach, docking, and recreational area.
  • Shore-lot owners sued to enjoin use of Lot 26 as a common beach/dock and as common ingress and egress to the pond, asserting that the restrictions reflected a residential-only shorefront plan.

Issues

  1. Whether restrictive covenants aimed at residential dwelling construction may, when read in context, restrict the use of the lot itself to residential purposes.
  2. Whether Lot 26 could be used as a common beach, docking, and access area for a large back-lot development consistent with the subdivision’s restrictive-covenant scheme.
  3. Whether a permanent injunction was proper to prevent uses of Lot 26 inconsistent with the common residential plan applicable to shorefront lots.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the permanent injunction.
  • The court held that the covenants, construed in light of the subdivision’s general plan and residential character of the shorefront lots, restricted Lot 26 to residential use comparable to the other shore lots.
  • The proposed common-access use for back-lot owners was inconsistent with that residential scheme and was therefore prohibited.
  • Restrictive covenants are construed to effect the intent of the parties and the subdivision’s general development plan, not solely by a narrow, literal focus on isolated words.
  • Covenants that regulate residences and related residential development may, in context, limit the permissible use of the land itself to residential purposes, even absent an express ban on a specific nonresidential use.
  • Where purchasers rely on a common scheme governing similarly burdened lots, courts may enjoin a materially different, higher-intensity use that would alter the character contemplated by that scheme.

Conclusion

The court enforced the shorefront subdivision’s residential-use plan by reading the residential building restrictions as limiting lot use, and it barred converting a shore lot into a common beach and docking facility serving a separate back-lot community.