## Facts

- Jamie Searcy was pregnant and had previously delivered a child by caesarean section.
- In this pregnancy, Jamie wanted to attempt a vaginal birth after caesarean section (VBAC).
- Jamie’s physician recommended against a vaginal birth but ultimately agreed to allow her to attempt VBAC.
- During labor and delivery, Jamie’s uterus ruptured.
- The rupture deprived the baby, J.S. (a minor), of oxygen.
- J.S. suffered oxygen deprivation and later developed cerebral palsy.
- J.S., through Jamie as next friend, asserted a personal-injury claim based on the birth injury.
- Jamie and her husband, Nathan Searcy, asserted individual claims for past and future medical expenses arising from J.S.’s injury.
- The delivering physician and hospital were affiliated with the United States Public Health Service, so federal law required the Searcys to sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) rather than sue the provider entities directly.
- The United States raised a comparative-negligence/apportionment defense, alleging damages should be reduced because Jamie bore some fault by insisting on a risky VBAC.
- The Searcys moved to strike the comparative-negligence/apportionment defense.

## Issues

1. Whether, under the FTCA applying Missouri law, the United States could plead comparative negligence and apportionment based on the mother’s decision to attempt a VBAC after medical advice against it.
2. If fault could be attributed to the mother, whether that attribution could reduce (a) the minor child’s personal-injury recovery, (b) the parents’ individual claims for medical expenses, or both.
3. Whether the comparative-negligence/apportionment defense was legally insufficient such that it should be stricken at the pleadings stage.

## Decision

- The court ruled on the Searcys’ motion to strike the United States’ comparative-negligence and apportionment defense.
- The court held that the government could not use the mother’s alleged negligence in choosing VBAC as a basis to reduce the minor child’s recovery for personal injury.
- To the extent the defense was directed at reducing the parents’ individual claims for medical expenses, the court addressed whether Missouri comparative-fault rules permitted the defense to remain as to those claims.
- The motion to strike was granted at least in part, limiting the government’s ability to allocate fault to the mother in a way that would diminish the child’s damages.

## Legal Principles

- Under the FTCA, the United States’ liability is determined “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” using the tort law of the state where the alleged negligence occurred.
- A motion to strike an affirmative defense tests legal sufficiency at the pleadings stage; defenses may be stricken when they fail as a matter of law.
- In birth-injury litigation, a child’s personal-injury claim is analytically separate from parents’ individual claims (such as claims seeking recovery of medical expenses they incurred or will incur).
- Comparative-fault theories aimed at blaming a parent for prenatal or childbirth-related choices are subject to limits grounded in state tort doctrine and public policy, including limits on attributing a parent’s conduct to reduce the injured child’s recovery.
- Fault allocation rules may operate differently for a parent’s own claim than for the child’s claim, because comparative negligence traditionally reduces the negligent claimant’s recovery rather than the recovery of a separate injured party.

## Conclusion

In **J.S. Searcy v. United States**, an FTCA birth-injury case arising from an attempted VBAC and resulting uterine rupture, the district court addressed whether the government could plead comparative fault against the mother for choosing VBAC and use that alleged fault to reduce damages. The court limited the defense, holding that the mother’s alleged comparative negligence could not be used to reduce the minor child’s personal-injury recovery, and it narrowed the scope of comparative-fault apportionment at the pleadings stage accordingly.


J.S. Searcy v. United States, 2018 WL 3733646 (2018)