## Facts

- JTC Petroleum Company operated as a road-repair “applicator” that applied emulsified asphalt to roads in southern Illinois.
- JTC alleged that incumbent applicators in the area agreed not to compete for public road-repair work and acted to exclude JTC from the market.
- Emulsified asphalt was a standardized key input, supplied by a small number of producers to a small number of applicators.
- JTC claimed incumbent applicators influenced or pressured producers to refuse to sell emulsified asphalt to JTC, preventing it from performing jobs.
- JTC offered circumstantial evidence that producers initially indicated willingness to supply JTC but later refused without persuasive business reasons.
- JTC also presented evidence of statements by incumbents implying they could prevent JTC from obtaining asphalt.
- Producers’ stated reasons for refusal (e.g., capacity, credit, or volume concerns) could be viewed as inconsistent with other evidence and therefore pretextual.
- JTC sued under Sherman Act § 1 and related antitrust theories; it settled with producers and some applicator defendants.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the remaining applicator defendants, and JTC appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence, viewed in JTC’s favor, permitted a reasonable jury to find an agreement among the remaining applicator defendants to restrain trade through bid rigging and a concerted refusal to deal, in violation of Sherman Act § 1.
2. Whether coordinated producer refusals and alleged pretextual explanations could support an inference of concerted action supporting the alleged applicator cartel and causing antitrust injury.
3. Whether summary judgment was improper because resolving competing inferences and credibility from circumstantial proof is for the jury.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for the remaining applicator defendants and remanded.
- The court held that JTC’s largely circumstantial evidence could allow a rational jury to infer a conspiracy to restrain trade.
- The court emphasized that the pattern of refusals to supply, coupled with the market’s economic features, supported an inference of concerted boycott rather than independent decisions.
- The court reiterated that at summary judgment the question is whether a jury could find for the nonmovant, not whether the nonmovant has conclusively proved its theory.

## Legal Principles

- A Sherman Act § 1 conspiracy may be proven through circumstantial evidence when the totality of facts supports an inference of agreement rather than mere parallel conduct.
- Coordinated refusals to deal, combined with weak or inconsistent business justifications that a factfinder could deem pretextual, may support a triable inference of concerted action.
- Market structure and industry economics (including standardized inputs and a small number of firms) are relevant to whether cartel behavior is plausible and enforceable, and therefore relevant to evaluating inferences from circumstantial evidence.
- On summary judgment, courts must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and may not resolve credibility disputes or choose among competing reasonable inferences.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that JTC produced enough circumstantial evidence, viewed alongside the market context, for a jury to find a § 1 conspiracy involving bid rigging and a boycott designed to exclude JTC, so summary judgment for the remaining applicator defendants was improper.


JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999)