## Facts

- Joel Judulang, a lawful permanent resident since 1974, entered the United States as a child.
- In 1988, he pleaded guilty in California to voluntary manslaughter and received a suspended sentence with probation.
- In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as deportable for an aggravated felony involving a “crime of violence” based on the 1988 conviction.
- Judulang sought discretionary relief under former INA § 212(c), which historically allowed certain long-term lawful permanent residents to seek a waiver of removal.
- Although § 212(c) was repealed in 1996, it remained available to certain noncitizens whose removability rested on pre-repeal guilty pleas.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied eligibility under its “comparable grounds” rule, which allowed § 212(c) applications in deportation cases only when the charged deportation ground closely matched a listed ground of exclusion.
- The Ninth Circuit denied Judulang’s petition for review and upheld the BIA’s rule.

## Issues

1. Whether the BIA’s “comparable grounds” rule governing § 212(c) eligibility in deportation proceedings is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
2. Whether an agency may make eligibility for discretionary immigration relief turn on categorical comparisons between deportation and exclusion grounds, rather than on factors related to the individual’s fitness to remain in the United States.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court held the BIA’s comparable-grounds rule arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
- The Court invalidated the rule because it lacked a reasoned explanation tied to the purposes of the immigration laws and made outcomes depend on happenstance charging choices.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

## Legal Principles

- Under the APA, agency policies must reflect reasoned decisionmaking; a rule is invalid if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
- An agency’s framework for determining eligibility for discretionary relief must bear a rational relationship to the statute’s aims and the considerations relevant to the relief.
- A rule is arbitrary where it makes legal eligibility depend on the government’s charging label rather than on the conduct and circumstances that the relief scheme is meant to evaluate.
- Administrative convenience does not justify an eligibility standard that is disconnected from statutory purpose.
- Immigration adjudication, including rules affecting access to discretionary relief, is subject to ordinary APA review for arbitrariness.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the BIA’s § 212(c) comparable-grounds rule failed APA review because it made eligibility for relief depend on irrelevant categorical matching and charging happenstance rather than on considerations tied to the statute’s purpose, and it sent the case back for further agency proceedings without that rule.


Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011)