## Facts

- Bosnian Croat and Muslim plaintiffs sued Radovan Karadžić, leader and president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb entity “Srpska,” alleging atrocities by forces under his command during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- The complaints alleged genocide and war crimes, including systematic rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture, inhuman treatment, summary execution, and wrongful death, aimed at destroying non-Serb populations in whole or substantial part.
- Plaintiffs alleged Karadžić acted either as head of Srpska or in collaboration with, and with support from, the recognized government of the former Yugoslavia/Serbia.
- The suits were filed in the Southern District of New York under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).
- Karadžić was personally served while in Manhattan as a United Nations invitee.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (finding insufficient “state action” under ATS/TVPA) and as a non-justiciable political question.

## Issues

1. Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS over claims alleging genocide, war crimes, and related violations committed by a non-state actor.
2. Which alleged violations of international law require action under color of a state’s authority, and whether the pleadings sufficiently alleged such state involvement.
3. Whether Karadžić could be treated as acting “under color of law of any foreign nation” for TVPA purposes.
4. Whether service of process and personal jurisdiction were defeated by immunity arguments based on Karadžić’s status as a U.N. invitee and the U.N. Headquarters Agreement.
5. Whether the claims were barred by the political-question doctrine.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the dismissals and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the ATS can reach certain law-of-nations violations committed by private individuals; genocide and certain war crimes are actionable without state action.
- For claims such as torture and summary execution, which generally require action under color of law, the allegations of cooperation with and significant support from a recognized state were sufficient at the pleading stage.
- The court rejected immunity from service of process, holding the U.N. Headquarters Agreement did not confer blanket immunity on all U.N. invitees served outside the U.N. Headquarters District; service in Manhattan was valid.
- The court rejected the political-question dismissal, concluding that adjudicating individual liability for alleged violations of international law arising from a foreign conflict is within judicial competence.

## Legal Principles

- The ATS provides jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of specific, universally recognized norms of international law.
- Genocide is a universally proscribed offense that binds individuals whether or not they act under color of law.
- Certain war crimes, including core obligations reflected in Common Article 3 applicable in internal armed conflicts, can apply to non-state armed forces and their leaders.
- Torture and summary execution are generally actionable under ATS/TVPA when committed by state officials or under color of law; “under color of law” may be shown by acting in concert with, or receiving significant aid from, a recognized state.
- U.N.-related immunity from service of process is limited; a U.N. invitee is not immune from service throughout the United States merely due to the invitation, particularly when served outside the U.N. Headquarters District.
- Claims alleging violations of international law are not rendered non-justiciable solely because they arise from a foreign civil war or occur alongside ongoing diplomatic activity.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that federal courts could hear ATS and TVPA claims against a non-state leader for alleged genocide and war crimes, permitted additional claims premised on pleaded state involvement, and rejected both asserted U.N.-invitee immunity and political-question grounds for dismissal.


Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)