## Facts

- Marilyn Kahn worked for Alameda County as a child welfare worker responsible for decisions affecting a foster child’s placement and welfare.
- The child received psychological testing and counseling from West Coast Children’s Center (WCCC), directed by Rosemary Bower.
- After disagreements about Kahn’s handling of the case, Bower sent a letter to Kahn’s supervisor criticizing Kahn’s competence and suggesting her conduct reflected hostility toward the child or handicapped children.
- Kahn was terminated after the letter, later prevailed in a civil-service proceeding, and was reinstated after the accusations were found unfounded.
- Kahn sued Bower and WCCC for libel based on the letter and for malicious prosecution based on alleged efforts to cause an internal proceeding to secure her dismissal.

## Issues

1. Whether a county child welfare worker is a “public official” for defamation purposes, requiring pleading and proof of New York Times “actual malice.”
2. If so, whether a libel complaint that omits allegations of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard states a cause of action.
3. Whether an internal employment-related administrative proceeding can support a malicious prosecution claim on the pleaded facts.
4. Whether prevailing defendants were entitled to attorneys’ fees.

## Decision

- The court affirmed judgment on the pleadings for Bower and WCCC.
- It held Kahn was a defamation “public official” because her discretionary authority over child placement and welfare implicated strong public interest and carried serious potential consequences.
- Because Kahn did not plead actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard), the libel claim failed on the face of the pleadings.
- The malicious prosecution claim also failed as pleaded, including because the internal administrative matter was not the type of proceeding that supports the tort and the elements were not adequately alleged.
- The court affirmed the denial of defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees.

## Legal Principles

- Government employees may be “public officials” for defamation purposes even without high rank when their duties involve substantial discretionary authority affecting matters of public concern.
- A public-official defamation plaintiff must plead (and later prove) “actual malice”: knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth; failure to plead it is a fatal defect supporting judgment on the pleadings.
- Malicious prosecution requires a qualifying prior proceeding and properly pleaded elements (including favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice); internal employment proceedings generally do not suffice on the pleaded facts.
- Attorneys’ fees are not awarded to prevailing defendants absent a statutory, contractual, or other recognized basis; denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The court treated a county child welfare worker as a defamation public official due to the discretionary power exercised over child welfare decisions, required New York Times actual malice pleading, and affirmed judgment for defendants because the complaint did not allege actual malice and did not state a viable malicious prosecution claim; it also affirmed denial of attorneys’ fees.


Kahn v. Bower, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1599, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)