## Facts

- Christine J. Young gave birth to a child on May 24, 1982, and brought a paternity action alleging Thomas Robert Kammer was the father.
- Young testified that Kammer was the only man with whom she had sexual intercourse during the year immediately preceding the child’s birth.
- Kammer denied paternity and asserted that his sexual relationship with Young ended more than fifteen months before the child’s birth.
- The court ordered blood testing of Young, the child, and Kammer under Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 5-1029.
- The testing was performed through an approved laboratory, and the results were introduced at trial over Kammer’s objection.
- The State’s laboratory witnesses were qualified in paternity testing and explained the laboratory’s calculation of a paternity index and a resulting “statistical probability of paternity,” using a prior probability of 0.5 based on the mother’s assertion that only Kammer could be the father.
- Kammer cross-examined the State’s witnesses and presented his own witness, a trained statistician, who challenged the use of the assumed prior probability and the resulting probability figure.
- Kammer also sought to introduce certain testimony that the trial court excluded as hearsay.
- A Baltimore City jury found Kammer to be the child’s father, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered a paternity decree on the verdict.
- Kammer appealed, asking the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to reverse based on alleged errors concerning the blood-test evidence, the exclusion of hearsay, and the refusal of requested jury instructions.

## Issues

1. Whether, under Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 5-1029 and due process (Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights), the trial court improperly admitted blood-test results and related testimony expressing a statistical probability of paternity.
2. Whether the trial court erred by excluding hearsay testimony offered by Kammer.
3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing Kammer’s requested jury instructions concerning evaluation of the blood-test evidence and related expert testimony.

## Decision

- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the paternity decree.
- The court held that, once the statutory requirements of § 5-1029 were satisfied, the blood-test results were admissible, and disputes about how the results were interpreted or presented (including statistical assumptions) went to the evidence’s weight for the jury, not to admissibility.
- The court rejected Kammer’s due process challenge, concluding the statute did not create a conclusive presumption and Kammer had a fair opportunity to contest the evidence through cross-examination and competing testimony.
- The court upheld the exclusion of the challenged hearsay testimony (and, in the alternative, found no basis for reversal on the record).
- The court held the trial judge did not err in refusing Kammer’s requested instructions because the charge as given fairly stated the governing law and left credibility and evidentiary weight to the jury.

## Legal Principles

- When a paternity-testing statute provides that qualifying blood-test results “shall be received in evidence,” satisfaction of the statute’s threshold conditions establishes admissibility; objections to assumptions and calculations generally concern weight and are for the factfinder.
- A statutory rule making a laboratory report prima facie evidence of blood-test results does not deny due process where the opposing party may cross-examine the laboratory witnesses, present contrary evidence, and argue against the conclusions.
- Laboratory personnel qualified in paternity testing may explain test results and the laboratory’s probability calculations where the statutory scheme contemplates presentation of a “statistical probability” and the opposing party can challenge the basis for those calculations.
- A trial court may exclude hearsay absent a valid exception, and an appellate court will not reverse for refusal of requested jury instructions when the instructions given adequately cover the law and the jury’s role in weighing evidence, including expert testimony.

## Conclusion

Kammer v. Young affirmed a jury-based paternity decree where blood tests ordered under § 5-1029 were performed by an approved laboratory and admitted along with testimony describing a statistical probability of paternity; the court treated objections to the statistical assumptions and probability presentation as matters for cross-examination and competing proof, rejected due process claims because the jury remained the decisionmaker and Kammer had a full chance to challenge the evidence, and found no reversible error in the exclusion of hearsay or in the trial court’s refusal to give Kammer’s requested jury instructions.


Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d 936 (1988)