## Facts

- K.B. was assigned female at birth but had lived as a man since age 15 and legally changed his name before marrying J.R.
- J.R. knew K.B.’s history when they married in New York in 1998.
- The couple agreed to have a child through artificial insemination using an anonymous sperm donor; the donor was selected to match characteristics of K.B.
- K.B. participated in the insemination process and signed the insemination consent form.
- J.R. gave birth in 2002 to K.B., Jr.
- The child’s birth certificate and medical and school records listed K.B. as the child’s father; J.R. was listed as the mother.
- In the child’s daily life, K.B. acted as “father,” the child referred to K.B. as his father, and J.R. supported and participated in K.B.’s parental role.
- The relationship deteriorated and the parties separated; at one point J.R. left the marital home for a time, leaving the child in K.B.’s sole care.
- The parties later consented to a declaratory judgment that their marriage was void.
- Both parties filed petitions seeking custody of K.B., Jr.
- J.R. argued K.B. lacked standing to seek custody because he was not the child’s biological parent and the marriage had been declared void.

## Issues

1. Whether K.B., a nonbiological spouse who consented to donor insemination and was treated as the child’s father, had standing to petition for custody under New York law.
2. Whether J.R. was equitably estopped from denying K.B.’s parental status after jointly planning the child’s conception and holding K.B. out as the father.
3. Whether a declaratory judgment voiding the parties’ marriage eliminated K.B.’s ability to be treated as a “parent” for custody-standing purposes.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court, Kings County (Morgenstern, J.), held that K.B. had standing as a “parent” to seek custody of K.B., Jr.
- The court rejected J.R.’s attempt to defeat standing based solely on the absence of a biological connection and the parties’ later judgment declaring the marriage void.
- The court concluded that, given the parties’ intentional creation of the parent-child relationship through assisted reproduction and their conduct after the child’s birth, it would be improper to treat K.B. as a legal stranger to the child for custody standing.
- The court determined that J.R. could not, after years of affirming K.B.’s role as father, deny that parental status to block K.B.’s custody petition.
- The matter was to proceed as a custody dispute between two parents, with the child’s best interests controlling any ultimate custody award.

## Legal Principles

- Standing to seek custody generally turns on whether the petitioner qualifies as a “parent” under New York custody law, rather than on the merits of the requested custody arrangement.
- In assisted reproduction cases, a nonbiological adult who affirmatively consents to and participates in the conception plan, and who is treated as a parent from birth, may be recognized as a parent for custody-standing purposes.
- Equitable estoppel may bar a biological parent from denying another adult’s parental status when the biological parent intentionally caused or allowed a parent-child relationship to form and the child relied on that relationship.
- The child’s welfare and continuity in family relationships are central considerations in custody and parentage-related standing disputes; courts may refuse to apply a narrow biology-only rule when doing so would sever an established parent-child bond.
- A judgment declaring a marriage void does not automatically erase the legal consequences of the parties’ intentional family formation and the parental role created and recognized during the relationship.

## Conclusion

K.B. v. J.R. holds that a nonbiological transgender spouse who consented to donor insemination and functioned as the child’s father had standing to seek custody, and that the biological mother could not use the parties’ later void-marriage judgment and lack of genetics to deny the parent-child relationship for standing purposes.


K.B. v. J.R., 26 Misc.3d 465 (2009)