Facts
- In 1963, Barry Keenan participated in the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr.; Keenan was convicted and imprisoned.
- Decades later, Keenan contracted with writers and media entities to sell rights to expressive works recounting the kidnapping, including print and film projects.
- Frank Sinatra, Jr. sued under Civil Code § 2225(b)(1), a “Son of Sam” provision that diverted a convicted felon’s proceeds from expressive materials “based on” or “includ[ing]” the story of the felony into a victim-compensation trust.
- The superior court issued a preliminary injunction restraining payment of Keenan’s share of proceeds and denied Keenan’s demurrer and motion to dissolve the injunction.
- After the Court of Appeal denied writ relief and upheld the statute, the California Supreme Court granted review on Keenan’s petition for writ relief.
Issues
- Whether Civil Code § 2225(b)(1), which redirects a convicted felon’s income from expressive works because they include the story of the crime, is a facially invalid content-based burden on speech under the First Amendment and California’s liberty of speech clause.
- Whether Keenan was entitled to writ relief directing the trial court to sustain his demurrer to the § 2225(b)(1) claim and dissolve the preliminary injunction.
Decision
- The California Supreme Court held Civil Code § 2225(b)(1) facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment) and under article I, section 2(a) of the California Constitution.
- The Court concluded the statute imposed a content-based financial penalty on protected expression and failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to the state’s asserted interests.
- The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Court of Appeal to order the superior court to sustain Keenan’s demurrer (as to the § 2225(b)(1) theory) and dissolve the preliminary injunction freezing proceeds.
Legal Principles
- A law that targets or diverts proceeds from expressive works because they contain the story of a crime is a content-based regulation of speech.
- Content-based financial burdens on fully protected expression trigger strict scrutiny and must serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored.
- Even where victim compensation and preventing criminals’ unjust enrichment are compelling interests, a statute is facially invalid if it is overinclusive (burdens substantial protected speech beyond what is necessary) or underinclusive (fails to address comparable non-speech-based profits).
- The availability of alternative, content-neutral mechanisms (e.g., restitution and ordinary judgment enforcement) bears on whether a speech-targeting scheme is narrowly tailored.
Conclusion
Civil Code § 2225(b)(1) was invalid because it selectively confiscated income from speech based on content—works recounting a crime—while sweeping broadly beyond what was necessary to compensate victims, requiring dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the statute-based claim.