## Facts

- Dwayne Kelley worked for Crosfield Catalysts as a laboratory technician on a rotating schedule of four 12-hour workdays followed by three days off.
- Kelley learned that the Brooklyn Bureau of Child Welfare was about to take custody of an eleven-year-old girl, Shaneequa Forbes.
- The girl’s birth certificate listed other individuals as her parents, though Kelley believed he might be her biological father and told supervisors she was his daughter.
- In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Kelley alleged Crosfield authorized him to travel to New York to “seek custody of [the girl] for foster care or adoption.”
- Kelley missed four scheduled workdays while in New York addressing the custody matter.
- When Kelley returned to work, Crosfield terminated him based on the four-day absence.
- Kelley alleged the stated reason for termination was pretext and that Crosfield terminated him for taking leave protected by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), including leave for “placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care.”

## Issues

1. Whether a court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may dismiss an operative amended complaint by recharacterizing its allegations based on statements in earlier, superseded complaints.
2. Whether allegations that an employee took authorized leave to seek custody of a child “for foster care or adoption,” followed by termination for the absence, state an FMLA claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and remanded.
- The court held the district court erred by treating the Second Amended Complaint as alleging a biological parent seeking custody of his own child, relying on statements in earlier pleadings.
- Construed as written, the Second Amended Complaint alleged leave connected to foster care or adoption, which falls within the FMLA’s covered leave categories at the pleading stage.
- Any inconsistency between earlier pleadings and the operative complaint could be addressed later; it did not justify dismissal at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

## Legal Principles

- An amended complaint supersedes prior complaints and becomes the operative pleading for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept well-pleaded allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; it may not rewrite the complaint to fit a different factual theory.
- Prior, superseded pleadings may function as evidentiary admissions later in the case, but they do not control the meaning of the operative complaint on a motion to dismiss.
- Allegations tying leave to the FMLA’s adoption-or-foster-care provision can state a claim at the pleading stage even if factual disputes remain about whether the leave ultimately qualifies.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal was improper because Rule 12(b)(6) review must be based on the operative Second Amended Complaint, which alleged authorized leave to seek custody for foster care or adoption and termination for taking that leave, sufficient to state an FMLA claim.


Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts, 135 F.3d 1202 (7th Cir. 1998)