## Facts

- Daniel Kelliher, an employee of the railroad, was injured on November 22, 1906, allegedly due to the railroad’s negligence.
- New York law provided a three-year limitations period for common-law personal injury actions.
- The New York Employers’ Liability Act created a statutory remedy for certain workplace injuries, conditioned on timely written notice to the employer and compliance with statutory time limits.
- Daniel did not file any personal injury action during his lifetime.
- Daniel died on February 24, 1912.
- Sarah Kelliher, as administratrix, sued the railroad asserting (1) a common-law negligence claim for the 1906 injury and (2) an Employers’ Liability Act claim based on the same injury.
- The railroad argued the common-law claim was barred because the three-year period expired during Daniel’s lifetime, and the statutory claim failed for noncompliance with the Act’s notice and timing requirements.

## Issues

1. Whether an administratrix may maintain a common-law personal injury action when the decedent’s claim was already barred by the statute of limitations before the decedent’s death.
2. Whether an administratrix may maintain an Employers’ Liability Act claim when the Act’s notice and timing conditions were not satisfied and no statutory action was brought by the decedent during life.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the entire action.
- The administratrix could not pursue the common-law negligence claim because the limitations period had run before the decedent’s death, leaving no enforceable right to survive.
- The administratrix could not pursue the Employers’ Liability Act claim because the Act created a new and distinct statutory cause of action subject to strict conditions (including notice and timeliness) that were not met.

## Legal Principles

- A personal representative’s claim for a decedent’s personal injuries is derivative; it survives only if the decedent had an enforceable cause of action at death.
- When a limitations period expires before death, the decedent’s personal injury cause of action is extinguished for purposes of survival, and the representative cannot revive it by suing after appointment.
- A statutory workplace-injury remedy may constitute a new and distinct cause of action separate from the common law.
- Statutory prerequisites to suit—such as written notice and statutory time limits—are substantive conditions of the statutory right; failure to satisfy them defeats the claim.

## Conclusion

The court held that neither a time-barred common-law personal injury claim nor a statutory employer-liability claim lacking required notice and timely commencement can be maintained by an administratrix after the worker’s death.


Kelliher v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1914)