## Facts

- Jane Linton Kennedy accused Charles Humphreys of rape; Humphreys was arrested and charged, and Robert Powell Cannon represented Humphreys.
- The State’s Attorney issued a public statement to the press describing the case.
- Cannon gave a statement to a local newspaper editor conveying Humphreys’s position that intercourse occurred but was consensual.
- The newspaper published an article reporting Kennedy’s rape accusation, Humphreys’s admission of intercourse, his belief that Kennedy consented, and his denial of rape.
- Kennedy sued Cannon for slander, claiming the publication implied she committed adultery and caused reputational and personal harm.
- Cannon admitted making the statement but asserted privilege, including that he was responding to the prosecution’s publicity and acting to protect his client in a racially charged situation.
- The trial court directed a verdict for Cannon on privilege grounds, and Kennedy appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether an attorney’s absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings extends to statements made to the press about a pending criminal case.
2. Whether Cannon’s press statement was protected by a qualified privilege as a matter of law, or instead presented jury questions (including abuse by malice or excessive publication).
3. Whether the published statement could reasonably be understood as imputing adultery or unchastity and thus constitute slander per se.

## Decision

- The court reversed the directed verdict for Cannon and remanded for a new trial.
- Absolute privilege did not apply because statements to the press were not made in the course of, or as part of, a judicial proceeding.
- Any qualified privilege was not conclusively established as a matter of law; whether a privilege existed and whether it was abused were questions for the jury.
- The defamation claim could proceed because a jury could interpret the publication as asserting consensual extramarital intercourse, subject to defenses and mitigation.

## Legal Principles

- Absolute privilege for attorneys applies to defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceedings and relevant to those proceedings (e.g., in-court statements and litigation documents); it does not extend to extrajudicial statements to the press.
- A qualified privilege may protect communications made in good faith to protect a legitimate interest, but it requires a proper purpose, proper recipients, and reasonable manner and scope.
- Qualified privilege can be lost through abuse, including malice, bad faith, or excessive publication; whether privilege applies and whether it was abused is ordinarily for the jury.
- In defamation, a publication that can reasonably be read to impute adultery or unchastity may support a per se theory, with damages issues subject to proof, defenses, and mitigation.

## Conclusion

The court held that an attorney’s absolute litigation privilege does not immunize press statements about pending cases, and that any qualified privilege for public responses made to protect a client generally turns on factual questions for the jury, requiring reversal of a directed verdict and a new trial.


Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54 (Md. 1962)