## Facts

- Kerr-McGee operated fixed offshore platforms in the Breton Sound gas field off Louisiana and employed Dorothy Lyons as a “switcher” to perform tests at wells and platforms.
- Kerr-McGee time-chartered crewboats, including the C.C. RIDER, from Ma-Ju Marine Services to transport workers among offshore locations.
- The C.C. RIDER was owned and operated by Ma-Ju and had a single crew member, its Ma-Ju-employed captain; Ma-Ju retained responsibility for navigation, operation, and maintenance.
- On July 4, 1982, Lyons fell from the vessel’s cabin deck to the main deck while descending a slippery stairway with inadequate or no railing when the vessel lurched, causing serious injury.
- Lyons received LHWCA workers’ compensation benefits from Kerr-McGee and then sued Ma-Ju and Kerr-McGee for vessel negligence under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), and sued Kerr-McGee under the Jones Act alleging seaman status.
- The district court directed a verdict for Kerr-McGee on the Jones Act claim (no seaman status), submitted § 905(b) claims to the jury, and the jury found Kerr-McGee liable but found Ma-Ju not liable.

## Issues

1. Whether Lyons qualified as a “seaman” under the Jones Act, permitting a Jones Act claim against Kerr-McGee.
2. Whether Kerr-McGee, as time-charterer, could be liable as a negligent “vessel” under LHWCA § 905(b) for injuries allegedly caused by vessel conditions or operation.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the directed verdict that Lyons was not a Jones Act seaman.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment imposing § 905(b) liability on Kerr-McGee.
- The court held Kerr-McGee, as time-charterer, did not assume or exercise control over vessel navigation, operation, crew, or physical condition sufficient to incur § 905(b) vessel-negligence liability.
- The jury’s finding of no liability for Ma-Ju was left undisturbed.

## Legal Principles

- Jones Act seaman status requires (1) work contributing to a vessel’s function or mission and (2) a substantial connection to a vessel or identifiable fleet in both nature and duration.
- Offshore workers whose primary duties are on fixed platforms do not become seamen merely because vessels regularly transport them; transportation-related time aboard is generally incidental and may not establish the required substantial connection.
- Under LHWCA § 905(b), a negligence action lies against a “vessel,” but a time-charterer is not treated as a vessel owner/operator absent a contractual assumption of, or actual control over, vessel operation, navigation, crew, or physical condition.
- Traditional time-charter allocations place responsibility for seaworthiness-related conditions, maintenance, and navigation on the vessel owner/operator, not the time-charterer controlling only the vessel’s commercial employment.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that an offshore platform worker transported by time-chartered vessels was not a Jones Act seaman where her work was principally tied to fixed platforms and her vessel connection was not substantial, and it further held that a time-charterer is not liable under LHWCA § 905(b) for vessel negligence without evidence that it assumed or exercised owner-type control over the vessel’s condition or operation.


Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Servs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1987)