Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015)

Facts

  • Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, married Kanishka Berashk, an Afghan citizen, in 2006.
  • Din filed an I-130 petition to classify Berashk as an immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act; it was approved in 2008.
  • At a consular interview in Islamabad, Berashk disclosed past employment as a payroll clerk for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Social Welfare from 1992–2003, including during Taliban control of Afghanistan.
  • A consular officer denied Berashk an immigrant visa and provided only a notice citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (terrorist activities inadmissibility), without further explanation.
  • Din sought additional information and, after receiving none, sued, alleging the unexplained denial violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights by burdening her ability to live in the United States with her spouse.
  • The district court dismissed for lack of a protected liberty interest; the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding a protected liberty interest in marriage and inadequate process.

Issues

  1. Whether a U.S. citizen has a constitutionally protected liberty interest implicated by denial of an immigrant visa to the citizen’s noncitizen spouse.
  2. If so, whether due process requires more than a consular notice identifying only the statutory ground for inadmissibility when the denial rests on terrorism or national security grounds.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, rejecting Din’s due process claim.
  • A plurality concluded Din was not deprived of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause and therefore was entitled to no process.
  • Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment (treated as controlling), assumed without deciding that Din had a protected liberty interest but held that the statutory citation to § 1182(a)(3)(B) supplied a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.
  • Because Din did not plausibly allege bad faith in invoking the terrorism inadmissibility ground, courts could not require additional explanation or probe the factual basis for the denial.
  • Judicial review of consular visa denials is highly constrained; where the Executive provides a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, courts generally may not look behind the decision.
  • In the visa-denial context, a challenger must plausibly allege bad faith before a court may demand more than the government’s stated reason.
  • When a visa is denied on terrorism or national security grounds, due process (even if assumed to apply) can be satisfied by notice identifying the applicable inadmissibility statute, absent a showing of bad faith.
  • The decision did not resolve whether the Constitution guarantees a U.S. citizen a substantive liberty interest in residing in the United States with a noncitizen spouse.

Conclusion

The Court held that the government did not violate due process by denying a spouse’s immigrant visa with notice limited to a statutory citation to a terrorism inadmissibility provision, where no plausible allegation of bad faith was made, and it left open whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in spousal reunification through immigration.