## Facts

- Paula Kevorkian, a licensed practical nurse, worked for Pawtuxet Village Nursing and Rehabilitation Center beginning in 1989.
- In April 1994, Judith Glass (director of nursing) suspended Kevorkian for three days for alleged insubordination, including an allegation that Kevorkian failed to dispense necessary medication.
- Kevorkian disputed the accusation and resigned, later obtaining other nursing employment.
- About two years later, Kevorkian used a nurse-placement agency (Mercury Medical) and authorized it to contact Pawtuxet Village for a reference.
- Mercury Medical faxed a reference form to Glass; Glass completed limited portions and faxed it back.
- Glass marked Kevorkian’s “appearance” as “very good,” answered “no” to whether she would rehire Kevorkian, and listed the reason as “unacceptable work practice habits.”
- Kevorkian sued Glass for defamation based on the “unacceptable work practice habits” statement.
- After an earlier procedural reversal in a first appeal, the trial court again granted summary judgment to Glass on a renewed motion.

## Issues

1. Whether the statement that Kevorkian had “unacceptable work practice habits,” made in a reference to a placement agency authorized by Kevorkian, was capable of a defamatory meaning.
2. Whether a statutory qualified privilege for employer references applied and, if so, whether Kevorkian produced sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to overcome the presumption of good faith.

## Decision

- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Glass.
- The court held the reference communication fell within a statutory qualified privilege for employer-to-prospective-employer communications.
- The statute created a presumption that the reference was made in good faith.
- Kevorkian failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption or show abuse of the privilege.
- Because no genuine issue of material fact existed on abuse of privilege, Glass was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- Communications by a former employer to a prospective employer about an employee’s job performance may be protected by a statutory qualified privilege.
- Where such a privilege applies, the employer’s communication is presumed to be made in good faith.
- The plaintiff bears the burden to show the privilege was abused, such as by proving malice, knowing falsity, reckless disregard for truth, or other bad-faith conduct.
- Mere disagreement with the employer’s evaluation or denial of the underlying performance concerns, without supporting evidence of bad faith, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
- Summary judgment is appropriate in defamation actions when the record does not permit a reasonable finding that a qualified privilege was abused.

## Conclusion

The court upheld dismissal of the defamation claim because the challenged job-reference statement was protected by a statutory qualified privilege, and the plaintiff did not produce evidence that the employer acted in bad faith or with malice sufficient to create a triable issue.


Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043 (R.I. 2007)