## Facts

- Two Glasgow shopkeepers were indicted for (1) supplying petroleum-based glue and related containers to named children under 16 for inhalation of solvent vapours to the danger of their health and lives, and (2) resetting stolen property obtained from some of those children in exchange for further solvent supplies.
- The Crown alleged the shopkeepers knew the children (approximately ages 8–15) were buying the items for “glue-sniffing” and knew inhalation was dangerous and potentially life-threatening.
- Police had previously warned the shopkeepers to stop supplying “glue-sniffing kits,” but the alleged conduct continued.
- At a preliminary diet, the accused challenged the indictment’s relevancy (arguing no crime existed because the items were lawful and solvent abuse was not criminal) and specification (arguing insufficient detail on ages, dates, and the reset course of conduct).
- The trial judge repelled the objections; the accused appealed on relevancy and specification.

## Issues

1. Whether supplying lawful solvents and containers to children, knowing they would be used for dangerous inhalation, can constitute a common-law crime in Scotland.
2. Whether the children’s voluntary inhalation breaks causation as a *novus actus interveniens*, defeating criminal responsibility for the suppliers at the pleading stage.
3. Whether the indictment provided fair notice, including whether it required greater specification of children’s ages and relevant time particulars for the supply and reset charges.

## Decision

- The High Court of Justiciary refused the appeals and upheld the relevancy of both charges, subject to amendment providing better notice of the children’s ages.
- The court held charge 1 disclosed a crime known to Scots common law as an application of an established category (wilful or reckless conduct causing real injury), even without a factually identical precedent and even though the items supplied were lawful.
- The court rejected a dispositive legal distinction between “administration” of a dangerous substance and “supply” where the supply was alleged to be for the purpose of dangerous inhalation by children with knowledge of the risk.
- The court held the children’s inhalation did not, as a matter of law, break causation; whether the supply caused injury was for the jury.
- On notice, the court held precise ages were not necessary to relevancy for charge 1 but were required for fair notice; the prosecutor undertook to amend by adding each child’s date of birth.
- The court held charge 2 (reset) was sufficiently specified despite a broad time frame because it alleged a continuing course of conduct involving identified stolen items.

## Legal Principles

- Conduct can be criminal at common law if it falls within an existing category of criminal conduct, even if there is no exact precedent on the same facts.
- Wilful or reckless exposure of another to a dangerous substance that can cause injury or death is actionable as common-law criminality; “supply” may be treated as equivalent to “administration” when the supply is made for the purpose of dangerous use with knowledge of the risk.
- Foreseen and intended conduct by the recipient that is part of the contemplated sequence (here, inhalation) is not necessarily a *novus actus interveniens*; causation may remain a jury question.
- Relevancy (whether the libel discloses a crime) is distinct from fair notice; an indictment may be relevant yet still require additional particulars to allow adequate preparation of a defense.
- In allegations of a continuing course of conduct, substantial latitude in time specification may be permitted if the substance of the accusation is clear.

## Conclusion

The court sustained the indictment, holding that supplying lawful solvents to children for dangerous inhalation can fall within established common-law criminal categories, that causation and the effect of the children’s acts were jury questions, and that fair notice required amendment to specify the children’s dates of birth while allowing broader time latitude for a continuing reset allegation.


Khaliq v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, 1984 J.C. 23 (Scot. High Ct. Just. 1983)